Kabobo-Luama Protected Area Landscape Management



Mid-Term Review

Final (March 31, 2026)

Country: Democratic Republic of Congo	**Implementing Partner (GEF Executing Entity):** Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature (ICCN)	**Responsible Partner:** Wildlife Conservation Society

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Start of Mid-Term Review: December 22, 2025	Expected end date: March 31, 2026

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
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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADPE	Association de Développement pour la Protection de l'Environnement
AIGA	Alternative Income Generating Activities
BNS	Basic Necessities Survey
CCC	Comité de Conservation Communautaire
CFLEDD	Coalition des Femmes Leaders pour l'Environnement et le Développement Durable
CGCC	Comité de gouvernance pour la conservation communautaire
CLC	Comité Local de Conservation
CLG	Comité Local de Gouvernance
CLIP	Consentement Libre, Informé et Préalable (FPIC)
CO	UNDP Country Office
CPE	Coordination Provinciales de l'Environnement
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ESIA	Environmental & Social Impact Assessment
ESMF	Environmental and Social Management Framework
ESMP	Environmental and Social Management Plan
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FPIC	Free Prior Informed Consent
GAP	Gender Action Plan
GED	Gender and Environment for Development)
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GIS	Geographic Information System
GRM	Grievance Redress Mechanism
ha	hectare
HACT	Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers
ICCN	Congolese Institute for the Conservation of Nature
IP	Implementing Partner
IPAPEL	Inspection Provinciale de l'Agriculture, Pêche et Élevage
IPP	Indigenous Peoples Plan
KFW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
LRP	Livelihood Restauration Plan
LPAC	Local Project Appraisal Committee
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAPEEDD	Ministère de l'Agriculture, pêche, élevage, environnement et développement durable (Tanganyika)
MEDD	Ministère de l'Environnement et du développement durable (National)
MINAGRIPEL	Ministère de l'Agriculture, de la pêche et de l'élevage (National)
MMP	Migration Management Plan
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIM	National Implementation Modality
NP	National Park
NR	Nature Reserve
PCAT	Partner Capacity Assessment Tool
PES	Payment for Ecosystem Services
PIF	Project Identification Framework
PIR	Project Implementation Report
PMU	Project Management Unit
ProDoc	Project Document
RAP	Resettlement Action Plan
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
REFETANG	Réseau des Femmes de Tanganyika
REPALEAC	Réseau des Populations Autochtones et Communautés Locales pour la gestion durable des Ecosystèmes forestiers d'Afrique Centrale
REPALEF	Réseau des Populations Autochtones et Locales pour la gestion durable des Écosystèmes Forestiers de la RDC

RP	Responsible Partner
RTA	Regional Technical Advisor
SBAA	Standard Basic Assistance Agreement
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and sexual Abuse
SES	Social and Environmental Safeguards of UNDP
SESP	Social and Environmental Risk Screening Procedure
SH	Sexual Harassment
SMART	Spatial Monitoring and Reporting Tool
TBWP	Total Budget and Work Plan
TE	Terminal Evaluation
TL	Team Leader
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	US Dollar
WCS	Wildlife Conservation Society
WG	Working Group
WR	Wildlife Reserve
WWF	World Wildlife Fund


N
Réserve naturelle de Ngandja
Lac Tanganyika
Réserve de Faune de Kabobo
Domaine de chasse de Luama Katanga
Sources: Esri, Airbus DS, USGS, NGA, NASA, CGIAR, N Robinson, NCEAS, NLS, OS, NMA, Geodatastyrelsen, Rijkswaterstaat, GSA, Geoland, FEMA, Intermap and the GIS user community
Aires protegées
Lac Tanganyika
Zones_à_utilisation_multiple
Zone_tampon
Province du Tanganyika
Province du Sud_Kivu
0 5 10 20 30 40 50
Km
ICCN
WCS

1. Executive Summary

The Kabobo–Luama Landscape on the western shore of Lake Tanganyika in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) comprises the Kabobo Wildlife Reserve (147,710 ha), the Luama-Katanga Hunting Reserve (230,351 ha), and the Ngandja Wildlife Reserve (289,244 ha). It forms part of the Albertine Rift biodiversity hotspot and encompasses diverse ecosystems (miombo woodlands, montane forests, wetlands, and freshwater systems), and provides critical ecosystem services to 120 communities, including 46 communities of the indigenous Batwa.

The landscape is characterized by ethnic diversity and complex tenure systems. Livelihoods depend heavily on forest resources, agriculture, herding, fisheries, and mining, in the context of severe poverty, food insecurity, weak infrastructure and limited access to services. Demographic change, migration, and protracted conflict have intensified land and resource pressures, generating social tensions and insecurity. Governance capacity remains limited: ICCN and provincial environmental institutions are understaffed, and under-resourced, and customary authorities face a declining legitimacy.

The project responds to interlinked environmental, institutional, and socio-economic barriers, including weak institutional capacity, limited protected area governance and enforcement, poverty-driven overexploitation of natural resources, and insufficient knowledge management and gender mainstreaming. The objective of the project is to strengthen participatory landscape management, conserve endangered species and outcompete the economic drivers of deforestation and biodiversity loss through sustainable local development. Four components focus on: (1) institutional capacity strengthening; (2) enhanced protected area management; (3) sustainable livelihoods; and (4) safeguards, learning, and gender mainstreaming.

Implemented under UNDP National Implementation Modality with ICCN as Implementing Partner (IP) and WCS and responsible partner (RP), the five-year project (2022–2027) includes a safeguard package, participatory management planning, a Mid-Term Review (MTR, originally scheduled for 2024), and a business plan to ensure financial sustainability and benefit-sharing. Total financing amounts to USD 11.43m, including USD 7m counterpart funds from the Government of the RDC. The project is classified as High Risk, requiring robust safeguard compliance to mitigate displacements, conflicts, discrimination, and other human rights risks.

MTR Ratings & Achievement Summary Table for Kabobo-Luama Protected Area Landscape Management Project

Measure	Output	MTR Rating[1]
Progress towards results	Overall: Strengthen the management of the Kabobo-Luama protected area landscape and enhance conservation of endangered species for local sustainable development and global biodiversity benefits.	Highly Unsatisfactory
	Outcome 1: Improved management of the Kabobo-Luama Protected Area Landscape	Highly Unsatisfactory
	Outcome 2: Increased management effectiveness of Kabobo, Luama-Katanga, and Ngandja Reserves, with increased capacity to combat wildlife crime	Unsatisfactory
	Outcome 3: Livelihood-driven threats to biodiversity within and around PAs reduced.	Highly Unsatisfactory
	Outcome 4: Mainstreaming of gender and indigenous peoples' concerns, and lessons learned through participatory project implementation and M&E are used to guide adaptive management, knowledge management, and communication in support of upscaling.	Highly Unsatisfactory
Project Implementation & Adaptive Management	While the RP was informed in November 2024 that the safeguard package (ESIA/ESMP, RAP/LRP, IPP & MMP) does not meet the requirements of UNDP's SES, to date no corrective actions were put in place and the RP maintains that the documents are of sufficient quality.	Highly Unsatisfactory
Sustainability	As implementation has not fully started, it seems highly unlikely to achieve sustainability within the residual project duration and with the remaining budget	Unsatisfactory

The MTR report assessed the project's performance against UNDP-GEF's MTR criteria, focusing on project strategy, progress towards results, implementation and adaptive management, and sustainability. Overall, the findings indicate that progress towards the intended

[1] Unsatisfactory (U): The objective/outcome is expected not to achieve most of its end-of-project targets. Highly Unsatisfactory (HU) The objective/outcome has failed to achieve its midterm targets and is not expected to achieve any of its end-of-project targets.

objective has been significantly slower than anticipated. While some foundational conservation activities have been initiated, key enabling elements, particularly safeguards, participatory governance, livelihood restoration and enhancement, and modern project management, remain insufficiently operationalized, thereby constraining progress across all outcomes.

The project design remains relevant and conceptually coherent, correctly identifying institutional, environmental, and socio-economic barriers to biodiversity conservation. The theory of change, linking institutional strengthening, participatory protected area management, and fostering sustainable livelihoods within a robust safeguard framework, remains valid and aligned with GEF and UNDP priorities. However, the design is assessed as very ambitious relative to the operational context and available resources. The pathways and components outlined in the ProDoc were formulated at a relatively generic level, leaving substantial operational detail to be developed during implementation. This has contributed to delays in translating strategic intent into concrete, sequenced activities on the ground. Furthermore, the reliance on significant counterpart funding and outsourcing the establishment of a comprehensive safeguard package in line with UNDP's Social and Environment Standards (SES) to the RP with limited oversight and technical support, while the safeguard package needs to be approved by UNDP before moving into implementation, further enhanced the operational risks.

Overall Progress: Progress towards results has been significantly constrained by delays in safeguards preparation and implementation, missing baseline data, and limited operationalization of the results framework. Monitoring and reporting systems remain underdeveloped, with key tools such as the METT and institutional capacity scorecard not updated since project inception. Outputs to date have focused predominantly on promoting conservation and biomonitoring. While valuable, these activities do not fully capture the multidimensional scope of the project, particularly in relation to livelihoods, governance, and institutional capacity development.

Outcome 1: Progress under Outcome 1 remains limited. Institutional capacity across partners has not demonstrated the expected improvement and, in some areas, was found to be below baseline levels. Coordination challenges between UNDP, ICCN, WCS, and local stakeholders have affected joint planning and implementation. Participatory governance mechanisms, including inclusive engagement of indigenous peoples, women, and marginalized groups, have not yet been sufficiently strengthened to enable the participatory landscape management planning to start.

Outcome 2: Some progress has been observed in biomonitoring, surveillance, and basic operational support to conservation teams. These activities have contributed to improved ecological data collection and continued presence in the landscape despite difficult operating conditions. Nevertheless, effectiveness gains remain difficult to quantify due to the absence of updated baseline indicators and management effectiveness assessments. Planned activities related to participatory land use mapping, zoning, infrastructure development, and eco-guard capacity strengthening have experienced delays due to the pending finalization of the safeguard frameworks. External pressures, including artisanal mining and overlapping mining concessions, also continue to pose significant challenges to protected area management but have not yet been adequately assessed beyond the generic statement that it should all be stopped, which appears unrealistic within the national and regional setting.

Outcome 3: Progress under the livelihood component is significantly behind schedule. Socio-economic baseline studies and feasibility assessments have been initiated; however, these studies remain preliminary and insufficiently comprehensive to guide large-scale livelihood interventions. At the time of the MTR, livelihood restoration and alternative income-generating activities had not yet been initiated. As a result, the project has not yet demonstrated measurable contributions to reducing livelihood-driven pressures on biodiversity. The 120 local communities, particularly the 46 settlements of the indigenous Batwa, which are economically displaced by the (re)creation of the three protected areas, reported that their incomes constantly deteriorate by an increased level of crop damage by wildlife while not having experienced any livelihood restoration and enhancement support and/or the delivery of social development (roads, schools, potable water, health centers, markets) that were in their view promised in exchange for their acceptance of the creation of the protected area network in

2012/3. There is clear evidence of a growing frustration with the delayed delivery of livelihood assistance that soon could end their compliance with hunting and gathering bans and zoning rules.

Outcome 4: Progress on safeguards and social inclusion has been significantly slower than envisaged in the ProDoc. Key documents, including FPIC processes, livelihood restoration, affirmative actions for indigenous Batwa, grievance redress mechanisms, and environmental and social mitigation measures, are not yet finalized and therefore not implemented. While initial steps such as a safeguards gap analysis and a safeguard action plan have been established in November 2024, enhancement has stalled, and the recruitment of specialized safeguards capacity remains pending. Gender mainstreaming and indigenous participation that should be integrated into the project design have not yet translated into systematic, landscape-wide implementation as all safeguard documents are four years after kick-off still not aligned with UNDP's SES.

Project Implementation and Adaptive Management: Project implementation is affected by coordination constraints, insufficient workplans and monitoring data, and limited availability of up-to-date progress reports. The absence of UNDP-approved Annual Work Plans since 1/2025 has created operational uncertainty, while reporting, which stopped after Q1/2025, remains largely activity-based rather than results-based. Adaptive management processes are present in principle but have not been sufficiently institutionalized. Identified risks, particularly safeguard gaps and governance challenges, have not consistently triggered timely corrective actions. Financing and co-financing delays, especially the non-materialization of anticipated counterpart funding, have further constrained the operational capacity of the implementing partner ICCN. The project failed to consider adapting the project focus to the Ngandja Reserve when ICCN mobilized 60 eco-guards partly funded from its own funds, partly mobilized by local militias that to date work outside the project's safeguard framework and have not benefited from conceptual and practical guidance on participatory management and supporting sustainable livelihood to outcompete drivers of biodiversity loss and deforestation. It is unclear whether the funds used by ICCN in Ngandja are considered as disbursement of counterpart funds.

Sustainability: Sustainability prospects are currently assessed as extremely low due to institutional, financial, and socio-economic risks. Institutional ownership remains weak, operational budgets for protected area management are insufficient, and livelihood benefits to communities have yet to materialize while being instrumental for the success of the project. In addition, delays in developing participatory management plans, benefit-sharing mechanisms etc. limit the likelihood that project outcomes will be sustained beyond the project lifecycle. Without accelerated implementation of safeguards, livelihood interventions, and institutional capacity strengthening, the project does not only fail to deliver of its social and livelihoods objectives but even the long-term sustainability of conservation gains remains uncertain.

Key Cross-Cutting Findings

1. The MTR found **major gaps and dysfunction in CO oversight**. While the CO identified during a July 2024 supervision mission that "the local communities were not involved in setting the boundaries of the (Ngandja) reserve and are not involved in its management"; i.e. identifying a clear non-compliance with the approach outlined in the ProDoc, this finding did not trigger any corrective actions and/or change in the risk rating.
2. The **CO appears to struggle with weak governance and exhibits limited capability in project oversight and SES risk management** (i.e. safeguard oversight). The ESIA-ESMP process (incl. GRM, RAP, LAP, IPP, MMP, BAP, HSP and updated SEP and GAP) instigated by the CO and RP in 2024 did not meet UNDP SES requirements and has not led to any improvements in the project safeguard practices. The underlying issue seems to be that the CO didn't clearly communicate that the documents were not satisfactory before the RP disbursed the final payments and was then unable to convince the RP to bring the project back into compliance in due time without the mobilization of additional funds. While the ProDoc clarifies that no activities that entail potential adverse impacts can commence

before the safeguard package is in place, which for UNDP implies that they meet the minimum standards outlined in UNDP's SES, the CO seem to have struggled to communicate this to the RP and stop the biomonitoring that entails destroying snares, reporting to the local authorities and dispossessing people of bushmeat, NTFPs etc.

3. The **RP contract** is not fit-for-purpose and requires renegotiation as the CO has limited to no control over planning, budget allocation or instruments to verify reported costs. The limited transparency of how expenditures by the IP and the RP relate to budget allocations warrant a full audit of expenditures by the IP and the RP.
4. While the **ProDoc tasked the RP to focus equally on capacity building (USD 0.7m), co-management of protected areas (0.8m) and livelihood enhancement (0.9m), since 4/2023, the RP focuses nearly entirely on biomonitoring** (22 staff) while the participatory landscape and PA management plans are not yet drafted through the participatory process outlined in ProDoc (community land use maps etc.) and not aligned with UNDP SES (associated safeguard measures specifically for economic displacement and integration of IPs of insufficient quality). While the ProDoc provided the largest budget for livelihood enhancement and social infrastructure, the RP allocated only two staff to this task and has to date not completed the underlying basic need study and local development plan and not implemented any action besides of community sensitizations to stop hunting. The RP was planning to finance the livelihood activities through a USAID Project, but this did not materialize and this cross-financing was also not formally agreed with the CO.
5. **For stakeholder engagement and ensuring/documenting FPIC, the RP uses written agreements in French with the chefs[2], which are installed by the government and often do not live in the involved 120 villages, in an area where the literacy rate is below 10% and hardly anybody in the villages speak French**. It is worrying that the RPs regional safeguard staff consider this approach to be in line with UNDP's SES while anthropological studies suggest that this governance model has lost its relevance and the fact that the Batwa are an egalitarian society without rulers etc. who have not agreed to be subjects of, and represented by, the Bantu chiefs.
6. While in 2012/3 the local population seems to have been willing to not use the core area of the reserve in exchange for local development (roads, schools, potable water, health centers, livelihood support, and compensation for wildlife damages to their crops etc.), **local support for sustainable development seems to have been significantly reduced as the promised social development and livelihood support has not materialized**. The indigenous Batwa that were forced to give up hunting and gathering did not receive, as foreseen in the ProDoc, adequate alternative livelihoods to restore their livelihoods, specifically land and support to start farming, and are forced to work as day laborers at USD 0.25 to 0.5/day.
7. While ICCN has not yet deployed in two of the three PA eco-guards to enforce laws, the RP's bio-monitoring team is said to destroy snares and confiscate forest products also

[2] In the DRC, customary authorities (e.g., chefs de village, groupement, chefferie, secteur) are often treated as legitimate representatives of local communities due to their purported cultural authority and proximity to populations; however, contemporary social science highlights that the "cultural authority" was often assigned to them under the indirect system of colonial administration and that they operate within hybrid governance systems, where accountability is often more oriented toward state structures and external actors that toward constituents. One of the key elements to instrumentalize them as ancillaries of the state is that they are appointed by the government. As a result, they often present themselves as gatekeepers or brokers, while embodying the risks of elite capture, rent-seeking, and selective representation, particularly in relation to land allocation and benefit distribution. Moreover, customary systems can reproduce hierarchical and exclusionary dynamics, often underrepresenting women, youth, migrants, and non-dominant lineages. While the claim to represent also the indigenous Batwa this is rather questionable as Batwa have no access to become chiefs. Accordingly, reliance on chiefs as sole proxies for "community consent" is problematic, and good practice (e.g., under UNDP SES) requires triangulated, inclusive, and independently verifiable stakeholder engagement processes beyond customary leadership structures.

outside the reserve etc. In the Ngandja reserve, where the RP has not started capacity enhancement, stakeholder engagement, and livelihood development, the IP has deployed 60 eco-guards. The project provides limited safeguard guidance to these eco-guards who report in a report that were received by RP and CO that they **burned down a settlement** in the reserve without following proper protocols in line with UNDP's SES. The well-intentioned but misguided IP senior staff funded by the project has an informal arrangement in place under which local militias deploy and pay for 50% of the 60 eco-guard and have announced **to execute gorilla or chimpanzee poachers**.

8. The RP was potentially involved in the **physical displacement** of indigenous Batwa from one or more of the protected areas before these were established. The scale of displacements/resettlement in 2012/3 warrants further fieldwork. While not conducted under this project, the question is whether the project development's due diligence sufficiently asked why there is not a single settlement, even by the Batwa, in the two southern reserves and what the plan is for the villages/camps in the northern reserve.
9. While the government allocated a mining concession in the Kabobo reserves and artisanal mining is found in all reserves, the RP does not assess or monitor the impacts of these activities, nor has established a strategy on how to contain this by agreeing on mercury-free mining methods etc., as the RP's present strategy to call for a complete mining ban seems unrealistic.
10. A **GRM,** which has been gradually updated since 6/2025, is unknown to most people in the 120 communities and seems to be limited to providing people affected by crop damages from wildlife with an avenue to voice their concerns, but is without a strategy or mechanism on how to respond and/or provide remedies. Significant grievances such as indications that the boundary of the core area of the reserve are in local farms 2 km away from a village seem to not be recorded and there seems to be no willingness to address the issue "as the boundaries have been participatory established."

Recommendations

- UNDP issues a 'stop order' on all expenditure by RP and IP until further notice. This is necessary as the RP is presently operating under a reimbursable contract that provides the CO with very limited control on upfront expenditure.
- UNDP to commission a full audit of the expenditures by IP and RP to date to establish alignment of expenditures to project/ProDoc approved budget and activities and to clarify which activities reported under the project were financed by the project and which by other financial partners such as USAID etc. and/or counterpart funds and what residual funds are available for the next steps and whether there were any misallocations.
- UNDP to secure realistic financing arrangements with GEF and other partners and revisit counterpart funding assumptions.
- UNDP to develop a Responsible Exit Plan that uses the remaining available funds to
  - Remediate the social gaps including livelihood restoration, targeted affirmative actions for Batwa (secured access to farmland), compensation for crop damage resulting from human wildlife conflicts, participatory mapping, enhance GRM effectiveness, and
  - Lay the foundation for future investments, such as producing and validating an FPIC-compliant landscape management plan, using biomonitoring data, participatory mapping and comprehensive time-bound livelihood restoration and enhancement plans.
- CO and RP to renegotiate the RP contract based on the responsible exist strategy that includes that UNDP SES commitments are built into an Environmental and Social Commitment Plan.
- Urgent finalization and operationalization of the full safeguard package, including FPIC and GRM.
- Re-sequencing of activities to prioritize social baseline data, participatory mapping, and livelihood restoration.
- Align conservation enforcement with SES-compliant community engagement and benefit-sharing.

While the project remains strategically relevant, it is operationally misaligned with its design assumptions and safeguard requirements. The combination of delayed safeguards, weak monitoring systems, limited livelihood implementation, and governance fragmentation has significantly constrained progress across all outcomes. Unless rapid corrective measures are implemented, particularly for safeguards, livelihoods, and institutional coordination, the project is unlikely to achieve its intended integrated conservation and development impacts within the remaining implementation period.

1. Résumé exécutif

Le paysage de Kabobo-Luama, situé sur la rive occidentale du lac Tanganyika, à l'est de la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC), comprend la réserve de Kabobo (147 710 ha), la réserve de Luama-Katanga (230 351 ha) et la réserve de Ngandja (289 244 ha). Il fait partie de la zone sensible de la biodiversité du rift Albertin et englobe divers écosystèmes (forêts de Miombo, forêts des montagnes, zones humides et systèmes d'eau douce). Il fournit des services écosystémiques essentiels à 120 communautés, dont 46 communautés autochtones Batwa.

Le paysage se caractérise par une diversité ethnique et des systèmes fonciers complexes. Les moyens de subsistance dépendent fortement des ressources forestières, de l'agriculture, de l'élevage, de la pêche et de l'exploitation minière, dans un contexte de pauvreté extrême, d'insécurité alimentaire, d'infrastructures fragiles et d'accès limité aux services de base. Les poussées démographiques, les migrations et les conflits prolongés ont intensifié les pressions sur les terres et les ressources, générant des tensions sociales et de l'insécurité. Les capacités de gouvernance restent limitées : l'ICCN et les services déconcentrés de l'environnement au niveau provincial manquent des personnels et de ressources, et les autorités coutumières sont confrontées à une baisse de leur légitimité.

Le projet répond à des obstacles environnementaux, institutionnels et socio-économiques interdépendants, notamment la faiblesse des capacités institutionnelles, la gouvernance et l'application limitée des zones protégées, la surexploitation des ressources naturelles due à la pauvreté, la gestion insuffisante des connaissances et l'intégration de la dimension de genre. L'objectif du projet est de renforcer la gestion participative du paysage, de conserver les espèces menacées et de contrer les facteurs économiques de la déforestation et de la perte de biodiversité grâce au développement durable. Ce projet est articulé autour des quatre composantes/volets, à savoir : (1) le renforcement des capacités institutionnelles ; (2) l'amélioration de la gestion des zones protégées ; (3) les moyens de subsistance durables ; et (4) les garanties, l'apprentissage et l'intégration de la dimension de genre.

Mis en œuvre dans le cadre de la modalité NIM du PNUD, avec l'ICCN comme partenaire d'exécution (PE) et WCS comme partenaire responsable (PR), ce projet quinquennal (2022-2027) comprend un ensemble de mesures de sauvegarde, une planification participative de la gestion, un examen à mi-parcours (MTR, initialement prévu pour 2024) et un plan d'affaires visant à garantir la viabilité financière et le partage des bénéfices. Le financement total s'élève à 11 430 000 USD, dont 7 000 000 USD de fonds de contrepartie provenant du gouvernement de la RDC. Le projet est classé comme présentant un risque élevé, ce qui nécessite le respect de mesures de sauvegarde rigoureuses afin d'atténuer les risques de déplacement, de conflit, de discrimination et autres risques liés aux droits humains.

Tableau récapitulatif des notes et des résultats de l'examen à mi-parcours pour la gestion du paysage de la zone protégée de Kabobo-Luama

Mesure	Résultat	Évaluation MTR[3]
Progrès vers les résultats	Globalement : renforcer la gestion du paysage de la zone protégée de Kabobo-Luama et améliorer la conservation des espèces menacées pour le développement durable local et la biodiversité mondiale.	Très insatisfaisant
	Résultat 1 : Amélioration de la gestion du paysage de la zone protégée de Kabobo-Luama	Très insatisfaisant
	Résultat 2 : Amélioration de l'efficacité de la gestion des réserves de Kabobo, Luama-Katanga et Ngandja, avec renforcement des capacités de lutte contre la criminalité liée aux espèces sauvages	Insatisfaisant
	Résultat 3 : Réduction des menaces pesant sur la biodiversité au sein et autour des aires protégées, liées aux moyens de subsistance.	Très insatisfaisant
	Résultat 4 : Intégration des questions liées au genre et aux peuples autochtones, et utilisation des enseignements tirés de la mise en œuvre participative du projet et du suivi et de	Très insatisfaisant

[3] Insatisfaisant : L'objectif/le résultat ne devrait pas atteindre la plupart de ses cibles de fin de projet. Très insatisfaisant : L'objectif/le résultat n'a pas atteint ses cibles à mi-parcours et ne devrait atteindre aucune de ses cibles de fin de projet.

	l'évaluation pour orienter la gestion adaptative, la gestion des connaissances et la communication à l'appui de la mise à l'échelle.	
Mise en œuvre du projet et gestion adaptative	Bien que le PR ait été informé en novembre 2024 que le dispositif de sauvegarde (EIES/PEM, PAR/PRL, PII et MMP) ne répondait pas aux exigences du NSE du PNUD, aucune mesure corrective n'a été mise en place à ce jour. Le PR maintient quant à lui que les documents sont de qualité suffisante.	Très insatisfaisant
Durabilité	La mise en œuvre n'ayant pas encore pleinement démarré, il est hautement improbable que la durabilité soit atteinte dans le délai restant et avec le budget disponible.	Insatisfaisant

Le rapport d'examen à mi-parcours a évalué les performances du projet par rapport aux critères d'examen à mi-parcours du PNUD-FEM, en se concentrant sur la stratégie du projet, les progrès vers les résultats, la mise en œuvre et la gestion adaptative, ainsi que la durabilité. Dans l'ensemble, les conclusions indiquent que les progrès vers l'obtention des résultats ont été, dans l'ensemble, nettement plus lents que prévu. Si certaines activités fondamentales de conservation ont été lancées, les éléments clés, en particulier les mesures de sauvegarde, la gouvernance participative, la restauration et l'amélioration des moyens de subsistance et la gestion moderne des projets, restent insuffisamment opérationnalisés, ce qui freine les progrès dans tous les domaines.

La conception du projet reste globalement pertinente et cohérente sur le plan conceptuel, identifiant correctement les obstacles institutionnels, environnementaux et socio-économiques à la conservation de la biodiversité. La théorie du changement, qui relie le renforcement institutionnel, la gestion participative des zones protégées et la création de moyens de subsistance durables dans un cadre de sauvegarde solide, reste valable et conforme aux priorités du FEM et du PNUD. Cependant, la conception est jugée très ambitieuse par rapport au contexte opérationnel et aux ressources disponibles. Les voies et les composantes décrites dans le ProDoc ont été formulées à un niveau relativement générique, laissant des détails opérationnels importants à développer pendant la mise en œuvre. Cela a contribué à retarder la traduction de l'intention stratégique en activités concrètes et séquentielles sur le terrain. En outre, le recours à un financement de contrepartie important et l'externalisation de la mise en place d'un ensemble complet de mesures de sauvegarde conformes aux normes sociales et environnementales (NSE) du PNUD au PR, avec un contrôle et un soutien technique limités, alors que l'ensemble des mesures de sauvegarde doit être approuvé avant de passer à la mise en œuvre, ont encore accru les risques opérationnels.

Progrès globaux : Les progrès vers l'obtention de résultats ont été considérablement freinés par des retards dans la mise en œuvre des mesures de sauvegarde, des données de référence incomplètes et une mise en œuvre limitée du cadre de résultats. Les systèmes de suivi et de rapport restent sous-développés, les outils clés tels que le METT et la fiche d'évaluation des capacités institutionnelles n'ayant pas été mis à jour depuis le lancement du projet. Les résultats communiqués à ce jour ont principalement porté sur la promotion de la conservation et de la biosurveillance. Bien que précieuses, ces activités ne reflètent pas pleinement la portée multidimensionnelle du projet, en particulier en ce qui concerne les moyens de subsistance, la gouvernance et le renforcement des capacités institutionnelles.

Résultat 1 : Les progrès réalisés dans le cadre du résultat 1 restent limités. Les capacités institutionnelles des partenaires n'ont pas connu l'amélioration escomptée et, dans certains domaines, se sont avérées inférieures aux niveaux de référence. Les difficultés de coordination entre le PNUD, l'ICCN, le WCS et les parties prenantes locales ont affecté la planification et la mise en œuvre conjointes. Les mécanismes de gouvernance participative, y compris l'engagement inclusif des peuples autochtones, des femmes et des groupes marginalisés, n'ont pas encore été suffisamment renforcés pour permettre le lancement de la planification participative de la gestion du paysage.

Résultat 2 : Des progrès ont été observés dans les domaines de la biosurveillance, de la surveillance et du soutien opérationnel de base aux équipes de conservation. Ces activités ont contribué à améliorer la collecte de données écologiques et à maintenir une présence continue sur le terrain malgré des conditions opérationnelles difficiles. Néanmoins, les gains d'efficacité restent difficiles à quantifier en raison de l'absence d'indicateurs de référence actualisés et

d'évaluations de l'efficacité de la gestion. Les activités prévues en matière de cartographie participative de l'utilisation des terres, de zonage, de développement des infrastructures et de renforcement des capacités des éco-gardes ont pris du retard en raison de la finalisation en cours des cadres de sauvegarde. Les pressions externes, notamment l'exploitation minière artisanale et le chevauchement des concessions, continuent également de poser des défis importants à la gestion des aires protégées, mais elles n'ont pas encore été évaluées de manière adéquate au-delà de la déclaration générique selon laquelle elles devraient toutes être arrêtées, ce qui semble irréaliste dans le contexte national et régional.

Résultat 3 : Les progrès réalisés dans le cadre du volet « moyens de subsistance » accusent un retard important. Des études socio-économiques de référence et des évaluations de faisabilité ont été lancées, mais elles restent préliminaires et insuffisamment exhaustives pour orienter des interventions à grande échelle en matière de moyens de subsistance. Au moment de l'examen à mi-parcours, la restauration des moyens de subsistance et les activités génératrices de revenus alternatives n'avaient pas encore été mises en œuvre. En conséquence, le projet n'a pas encore démontré de contributions mesurables à la réduction des pressions exercées sur la biodiversité a travers le développement des moyens de subsistance. Les 120 communautés locales, en particulier les 46 villages de la population autochtone Batwa, qui ont été économiquement déplacées par la (re)création des trois zones protégées, ont signalé que leurs revenus ont encore diminué en raison de l'augmentation des dommages causés aux cultures, sans avoir bénéficié d'aucune aide à la restauration et à l'amélioration des moyens de subsistance et/ou à la mise en place de mesures de développement social (routes, écoles, eau potable, centres de santé, marchés) qui, selon elles, leur avaient été promis en échange de leur acceptation de la création du réseau d'aires protégées. Il existe des preuves évidentes d'une frustration croissante face au retard pris dans la mise en place de l'aide aux moyens de subsistance, qui pourrait bientôt mettre fin à leur respect des interdictions de chasse et de cueillette et des règles de zonage.

Résultat 4 : Les progrès en matière de garanties et d'inclusion sociale ont été nettement plus lents que prévu dans le ProDoc. Les documents clés, notamment les processus de CPIF, la restauration des moyens de subsistance, les mesures d'action positive en faveur des Batwa autochtones, les mécanismes de règlement des griefs et les mesures d'atténuation environnementales et sociales, ne sont pas encore finalisés et ne sont donc pas mis en œuvre. Si les premières mesures, telles que l'analyse des lacunes en matière de garanties et le plan d'action pour celles-ci, ont été mises en place en novembre 2024, leur renforcement est au point mort et le recrutement de personnel spécialisé dans les garanties est toujours en suspens. L'intégration de la dimension de genre et la participation des populations autochtones, qui devraient être intégrées dans la conception du projet, ne se sont pas encore traduites par une mise en œuvre systématique à l'échelle du paysage, car quatre ans après le lancement du projet, tous les documents relatifs aux garanties ne sont toujours pas alignés sur le NSE du PNUD.

Mise en œuvre du projet et gestion adaptative : La mise en œuvre du projet est affectée par des contraintes de coordination, des plans de travail et des données de suivi insuffisants, ainsi que par la disponibilité limitée de rapports d'avancement actualisés. L'absence de plans de travail annuels depuis janvier 2025 a créé une incertitude opérationnelle, tandis que les rapports, qui ont cessé après le premier trimestre 2025, restent largement axés sur les activités plutôt que sur les résultats. Les processus de gestion adaptative existent en principe, mais n'ont pas été suffisamment institutionnalisés. Les risques identifiés, en particulier les lacunes en matière de sauvegarde et les défis en matière de gouvernance, n'ont pas systématiquement donné lieu à des mesures correctives en temps opportun. Les retards de financement et de cofinancement, en particulier la non-matérialisation du financement de contrepartie prévu, ont encore limité la capacité opérationnelle des principaux partenaires de mise en œuvre, notamment l'ICCN. Le projet n'a pas envisagé d'adapter son orientation au Ngandja lorsque l'ICCN s'est préparé à mobiliser 60 éco-gardes qui, à ce jour, travaillent sans bénéficier de l'alignement sur le cadre de sauvegarde du projet ou des orientations conceptuelles fournies par WCS :

Durabilité : les perspectives de durabilité sont actuellement jugées extrêmement faibles en raison des risques institutionnels, financiers et socio-économiques. L'appropriation institutionnelle reste faible, les budgets opérationnels pour la gestion des aires protégées sont insuffisants et les avantages en termes de moyens de subsistance pour les communautés ne se sont pas encore concrétisés, alors qu'ils sont essentiels à la réussite du projet. En outre, les retards dans l'élaboration de plans de gestion participative, de mécanismes de partage des avantages, etc. limitent la probabilité que les résultats du projet soient maintenus au-delà de son cycle de vie. Sans une mise en œuvre accélérée des mesures de sauvegarde, des interventions en faveur des moyens de subsistance et du renforcement des capacités institutionnelles, la durabilité à long terme des acquis en matière de conservation reste incertaine.

Principles conclusions

1. L'examen à mi-parcours a révélé **des lacunes et des dysfonctionnements importants dans la supervision du Bureau Pays du PNUD**. Alors que le Bureau Pays du PNUD avait constaté lors d'une mission de supervision en juillet 2024 que « les communautés locales n'avaient pas été associées à la délimitation de la réserve (de Ngandja) et ne participaient pas à sa gestion », c'est-à-dire qu'il avait identifié un non-respect manifeste de l'approche décrite dans le ProDoc, cette constatation n'a donné lieu à aucune mesure corrective ni à aucune modification de la notation des risques.
2. **Le Bureau Pays du PNUD semble confronté à une gouvernance faible et fait preuve d'une capacité limitée en matière de supervision des interventions du projet et de gestion des risques liés au NSE** (c'est-à-dire la supervision des mesures de sauvegarde). Le processus ESIA-ESMP (y compris GRM, RAP, LAP, IPP, MMP, BAP, HSP et SEP et GAP mis à jour) lancé par le PR en novembre 2023 n'a pas satisfait aux exigences NSE du PNUD et n'a conduit à aucune amélioration des pratiques de sauvegarde du projet. Le problème sous-jacent semble être que le bureau de pays a accepté les documents avant d'obtenir l'autorisation du RETA du PNUD et n'a ensuite pas été en mesure de mettre en place, en collaboration avec le partenaire de programme, des mesures visant à améliorer le dossier afin qu'il réponde aux exigences minimales. Bien que le ProDoc précise qu'aucune activité susceptible d'avoir des effets négatifs ne peut commencer avant l'approbation du dispositif de sauvegarde, le Bureau Pays semble avoir eu du mal à communiquer cette information au PR afin de mettre fin à la biosurveillance qui implique la destruction des pièges, le signalement aux autorités locales des personnes trouvées dans les réserves et la confiscation de la viande de brousse, des PFNL, etc.
3. **Le contrat du partenaire de mise en œuvre n'est pas adapté à l'objectif visé et doit être renégocié,** car le Coordinateur de projet n'a que peu ou pas de contrôle sur la planification, l'allocation budgétaire ou les instruments permettant de vérifier les coûts déclarés. Le manque de transparence quant à la manière dont les dépenses des PE et PR sont liées aux allocations budgétaires justifient un audit complet des dépenses du partenaire de mise en œuvre et du partenaire de mise en œuvre.
4. Alors que le **ProDoc chargeait le PR de se concentrer à parts égales sur le renforcement des capacités (700 000 USD), la cogestion des zones protégées (800 000 USD) et l'amélioration des moyens de subsistance (900 000 USD), depuis avril 2023, le PR se concentre presque exclusivement sur la biosurveillance** (22 employés), tandis que les plans participatifs de gestion du paysage et des aires protégées n'ont pas encore été élaborés dans le cadre du processus participatif décrit dans le ProDoc (cartes d'utilisation des terres par les communautés, etc.) et ne sont pas alignés sur le NSE du PNUD (mesures de sauvegarde associées spécifiquement au déplacement économique et à l'intégration des PA de qualité insuffisante). Alors que le ProDoc prévoyait le budget le plus important pour l'amélioration des moyens de subsistance et les infrastructures sociales, le PR a affecté deux personnes à cette tâche et n'a, à ce jour, pas encore achevé l'étude des besoins fondamentaux et le plan de développement local, et n'a mis en œuvre aucune action autre que la sensibilisation des communautés sur l'arrêt de la chasse. Le PR prévoyait de financer les activités liées aux moyens de subsistance par le biais d'un projet de l'USAID, mais cela


ne s'est pas concrétisé et ce financement croisé n'a pas non plus été formellement convenu avec le Bureau Pays du PNUD.


5. **Pour impliquer les parties prenantes et garantir/documenter le CPIF, le PR utilise des accords écrits en français avec les chefs mises en place par le gouvernement, qui ne vivent souvent pas dans les 120 villages concernés, dans une région où le taux d'alphabétisation est inférieur à 10 % et où presque personne ne parle français**. Il est préoccupant que le personnel régional chargé des mesures de sauvegarde du PR considère cette approche comme conforme au NSE du PNUD, alors que des études anthropologiques suggèrent que ce modèle de gouvernance perd de sa pertinence et que les Batwa sont une société égalitaire sans dirigeants, etc. et n'ont pas accepté d'être soumis aux chefs bantous.
6. Alors qu'en 2012/2013, la population locale semblait disposée à ne pas utiliser la zone centrale de la réserve en échange d'un développement local (routes, écoles, eau potable, centres de santé, aide à la subsistance et indemnisation pour les dommages causés à leurs cultures par la faune sauvage, etc.), **le soutien local au développement durable semble avoir considérablement diminué, car le développement social et l'aide à la subsistance promis ne se sont pas concrétisés**. Un nombre important d'autochtones Batwa qui ont été contraints de renoncer à la chasse et à la cueillette n'ont pas bénéficié, comme le prévoyait le ProDoc, de moyens de subsistance alternatifs adéquats, notamment de terres et d'une aide pour se lancer dans l'agriculture, et sont contraints de travailler comme journaliers pour 0,25 à 0,5 dollar par jour.
7. Alors que l'ICCN n'a pas encore déployé les douze éco-gardes de la zone protégée de Kabobo et Luama pour faire respecter les lois, l'équipe de biosurveillance du RP serait chargée de détruire les pièges et de confisquer les produits forestiers également en dehors de la réserve, etc. Dans la réserve de Ngandja, où le PR n'a pas encore commencé à renforcer les capacités, à impliquer les parties prenantes et à développer les moyens de subsistance, le PE a déployé 60 éco-gardes. Le projet offre un renforcement limité des capacités à ces éco-gardes qui indiquent dans leur rapport reçu par le PR qu'ils **ont incendié un campement** dans la réserve sans suivre les protocoles appropriés conformément au NSE du PNUD. Les cadres supérieurs de PE, bien intentionnés mais malavisés, financés par le projet, ont conclu un accord avec les milices locales **pour exécuter les braconniers de gorilles ou de chimpanzés**.
8. Le projet de développement a potentiellement impliqué **la réinstallation physique** des Batwa autochtones provenant d'une ou plusieurs zones protégées dans le cadre de la préparation du projet. L'ampleur de la réinstallation justifie des travaux supplémentaires sur le terrain. Bien que cela n'ait pas été réalisé dans le cadre de ce projet, la question est de savoir si la diligence raisonnable du développement du projet a suffisamment cherché à comprendre pourquoi il n'y a pas un seul village, même des Batwa, dans les deux réserves du sud et quel est le plan pour les villages/camps dans la réserve du nord.
9. Bien que le gouvernement ait attribué une concession minière dans les réserves de Kabobo et que l'on trouve des mines artisanales dans toutes les réserves, le promoteur du projet n'a pas évalué en détail les impacts de ces activités et/ou établi de stratégie pour les contenir en convenant de méthodes d'exploitation minière sans mercure, etc., car la stratégie actuelle du promoteur consistant à demander l'arrêt complet de l'exploitation minière semble irréaliste.
10. Le **GRM,** qui a été progressivement mis à jour depuis juin 2025, n'est pas connu de la plupart des habitants des 120 communautés et semble se limiter à offrir aux personnes touchées par les dommages causés aux cultures par la faune sauvage un moyen d'exprimer leurs préoccupations, sans stratégie ni mécanisme sur la manière d'y répondre et/ou d'apporter des solutions. Des griefs importants, tels que des indications selon lesquelles la limite de la zone centrale de la réserve se trouve dans des fermes locales situées à 2 km d'un village, ne semblent pas être enregistrés et il ne semble y avoir aucune volonté de traiter la question « car les limites ont été établies de manière participative ».

Recommendations

- Emmètre un « ordre d'arrêt » sur toutes les dépenses du PR et de PE jusqu'à nouvel ordre. Cette mesure est nécessaire car le PR fonctionne actuellement dans le cadre d'un contrat remboursable qui confère au Bureau Pays du PNUD un contrôle très limité sur les dépenses initiales (Responsable : PNUD)
- Diligenter un audit complet des dépenses engagées à ce jour par le PE et le PR afin d'établir une base claire pour les prochaines étapes (Responsable : PNUD)
- Garantir des modalités de financement réalistes et revoir les hypothèses de financement de contrepartie (Responsable : PNUD)
- Élaborer un plan de sortie responsable visant à utiliser les fonds restants du projet pour :
  - réduire les inégalités sociales, notamment par la cartographie participative, la restauration des moyens de subsistance, des mesures d'action positive ciblées pour les Batwa (accès garanti aux terres agricoles), l'indemnisation des dommages causés aux cultures par les conflits entre les humains et la faune sauvage, l'amélioration de l'efficacité de la GRM, et
  - jeter les bases d'investissements futurs, tels que l'élaboration et la validation d'un plan de gestion du paysage conforme au CPIF, l'utilisation de données de biosurveillance, la cartographie participative et des plans complets et limités dans le temps de restauration et d'amélioration des moyens de subsistance.
- Renégocier le contrat sur la base d'une stratégie de sortie responsable qui inclut l'intégration des engagements du PNUD en matière de NSE dans un plan d'engagement environnemental et social. (Responsables : PNUD et WCS)
- Finaliser et mettre en œuvre urgentes de l'ensemble des mesures de sauvegarde, y compris le CPIF et le GRM. (Responsables : PNUD et WCS)
- Réorganiser les activités afin de donner la priorité aux données sociales de référence, à la cartographie participative et à la restauration des moyens de subsistance. (Responsables : PNUD et WCS)
- Aligner l'application des mesures de conservation sur l'engagement communautaire et le partage des avantages conformes au NSE. (Responsables : PNUD et WCS)

Bien que le projet reste stratégiquement pertinent, il n'est pas aligné sur le plan opérationnel avec ses hypothèses de conception et ses exigences en matière des sauvegardes. La combinaison de sauvegardes retardées, de systèmes de suivi faible, d'une mise en œuvre limitée des moyens de subsistance et d'une fragmentation de la gouvernance a considérablement entravé les progrès dans tous les domaines. À moins que des mesures correctives rapides ne soient mises en œuvre, en particulier en matière de sauvegardes, de moyens de subsistance et de coordination institutionnelle, le projet a peu de chances d'atteindre les résultats escomptés en matière de conservation et de développement pendant la période de mise en œuvre restante.


Complexe de Kabobo - Luama
Lac Tanganyika
Réserve de Faune de Kabobo
Domaine de Chasse de Luama Katanga
RN5
Infrastructure
Localité
Route Nationale
Piste
Occupation du Sol dans la Réserve de Faune de Kabobo
Zones non forestières (30%)
Plans d eau (0,50%)
Savanes arborées / bois (37%)
Forêts primaires tropicales humides (30%)
Forêts secondaires tropicales humides (1%)
Perte du couvert forestier 2005-2010 (0,80%)
1:430,000
0 5 10 km
Classes d'Utilisation du Sol dans la Reserve de Faune de Kabobo (en km²)
Zone Tampon (220)
Usages multiples (360)
Zones Habitées (65)
Conservation Intégrale (1 324)
Sources des données :
Base de données WCS-RDC
Projet de Conservation de la Biodiversité de Kabobo
FACET (OSFAC, 2012)
Référentiel géographique commun de la RDC
WCS
Système de Coordonnées Géographiques
Ellipsoide de référence : WGS84
Annonces chiffrées en degrés, minutes
Réalisation : WCS-RDC/SIG
Février, 2017


PERTE COUVERT FORESTIER - NGANDJA
Lac Tanganyika
Couverture de la canopée
High : 100
Low : 0
Perte 2018
Sources des données
Base de données WCS-RDC
Projet de Conservation de la Biodiversité de Kabobo
Global Forest Change (2018)
Référentiel géographique commun de la RDC
Carte realisée par WCS - RDC/SIG
18, Avenue Roi Baudouin
Kinshasa-Gombe
Février 2020
Localité
Route secondaire
Route Nationale
Rivière
Système de référence
Système de Coordonnées Géographiques
Ellipsoide de référence : WGS84
Zone UTM 35S
Annonces chiffrées en degrés, minutes

2. Introduction

This mid-term review (MTR) assesses progress towards achieving the project's objectives and results, as specified in the ProDoc, and indicators of project success or failure, with a view to identifying any changes needed to put the project on track to achieve the expected results. More specifically, the MTR assessed early signs of project success, or failure, following the general guidance and methodology embedded in official UNDP and GEF documents, including but not limited to the core principles of integrity, accountability, respect, and beneficence of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG).

The MTR also examined the project strategy and risks to its sustainability. As UNDP's Social and Environmental Screening Procedure (SESP) had identified **a number of high risks** and tasked the project to establish as a first step of implementation mitigation measures related to the following UNDP environmental and social standards (ESS): human rights (P1); indigenous peoples (S6); displacement and resettlement (S5) and community health, safety and security (law enforcement by eco-guards, S3). This MTR included a compliance assessment against these principles and standards in line with the ToR for this assignment (see Annex 6.1).

2.1. Methodology

The MTR's methodology was informed by guidance from both UNDP and the GEF on evaluation processes. The main source of methodological inspiration, knowledge and resources was the website of UNDP's Independent Evaluation Office (IEO), which has been actively used (http://web.undp.org/evaluation/index.shtml). As mandated by the ToR, this MTR is guided by the 2014 "Guidance for conducting Midterm Reviews of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed Projects", available in English, French, and Spanish on the website of UNDP's IEO.

The Guidance provides general methodological frameworks for reviewing UNDP GEF projects and a thorough structure for MTR reports. While the guidance is not specific about a fixed objective for the MTR process it is prescriptive concerning the MTR findings, which should be presented around the following four areas: (A) Project Strategy, (B) Progress Towards Results, (C) Project Implementation and Adaptive Management, and (D) Sustainability. The assessment of progress against these elements is included in Section 4 of this report.

The MTR team reviewed all relevant and available sources of information, including documents prepared during the preparation phase, the project document, project reports, including the annual project review, project implementation reports, project budget revisions, national strategic and legal documents, relevant project contracts and agreements, project assessments and safeguards plans, SESP and UNDP SESPs, and any other documents that the team deemed useful or this evidence-based review against the results framework and progress indicators. It needs to be noted that the available documentation allows room for improvement. The MTR report therefore indicates which information was missing and what the team did to bridge the identified data gaps.

Besides document review, stakeholder engagement was essential to the success of this MTR. Consequently, the MTR team interviewed stakeholders who have responsibilities in the project, including, but not limited to implementing agencies, senior officials and work/component team leaders, responsible parties, key experts and consultants, project stakeholders, local authorities and CSOs, etc. To structure this work, the MTR Team conducted kick-off meetings with UNDP and ICCN on January 6 and 7, 2026, in Kinshasa, and with the local teams from ICCN, Provincial Government, WCS and the Comité local de Governance (CLG) on January 9, 2026, in Kalemie. Besides mutual introductions, the kickoff meeting aimed at, and resulted in, a mutual agreement on the methodology and the detailed workplan (see Annex 6.5). The team further debriefed UNDP, ICCN, WCS, the provincial government, the CLG and the provincial team of the national network of indigenous peoples (REPALEF) on January 21, 2026, which included the outcomes of the fieldwork, the key preliminary findings, initial recommendations, and next steps. The debriefing documented that the findings were accepted as being accurate and the initial recommendations as being sound.

During the kick-off meetings with UNDP and consequently engagements with the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), the MTR Team learned that from January 12, 2026 onwards all "operations along the Kalemie-Bendera-Manyanga axis were suspended until further notice" (DRC/UNDSS /SOC 12/1/2026) and consequently UNDP staff and consultants were advised not to travel north of Kalemie, i.e. visit the project area. Based on discussions with the WCS security advisor, the security advisor of NGOs working in Tanganyika and the national security services, the MTR Team decided to conduct the fieldwork despite this advice but reduce the number of days spent in the project area from ten to five and not to travel beyond the boundary between the Tanganyika and South Kivu Provinces to reduce exposure.

While the MTR team was still able to conduct meetings with three Bantu and three Batwa communities in the southern part of the Kabobo-Luama reserve, i.e., within the Tanganyika province, the MTR team did not travel to the Ngandja reserve in the South Kivu Province due to security concerns. However, we were still able to engage with key stakeholders as the new ICCN Conservator and his predecessor were so kind to travel four days by motorbike to meet us in person in Mazonde and to speak with Bantu and Batwa people from the communities in and around the reserve over the phone. In turn, we were not able to engage with the "Cosma Foundation," which was set up by the former Director of ICCN Cosma Wilungula and which obtained a concession agreement with ICCN to manage the Ngandja reserve, as it does no longer exist.

Due to the security concerns and the need to reduce the fieldwork duration, the MTR team was not able to conduct the quantitative survey of a representative sample of vulnerable/marginalized strata of the Bantu and Batwa populations in the 120 villages around the three reserves, which was envisaged in the scoping report that was accepted by UNDP on December 30, 2025. To overcome this challenge, the MTR team conducted community meetings to triangulate and assess the benefits and impacts the project had delivered to date. As WCS focuses its work on the southern part of the landscape and did not conduct any social development work in or around the Ngandja reserve, it can be assumed that the benefits and impacts in the surveyed villages are more visible than in the northern section of the landscape.

Within this setting, the MTR followed a collaborative and participatory approach and had the following engagements:

- In-person meetings with the **UNDP** Project Team in Kinshasa (Prof Kamathe Katsongo, Astrid Ntanga, Nelly Kankolongo, and Evelynew Iyandza) and several calls with regional technical and safeguard advisers (Patricia de la Cueva, Bonnie Rusk, and Jake Willis). The team also benefited from the support of UNDSS (Solange Bashwira, Bienvenu Ramazani), Joseph Ezoua (CO Programme Manager) and UNDP's office in Kalemie (Herculan Muntasomo).
- In-person meetings with the **implementing partner (IP) ICCN** at the national level in Kinshasa (Prof Godefroid Mwamba), its Kabobo team in Kalemie (Bertin Tumonakiese Makwala and Eric Ossier) and its Ngandja team (David Amani Kabaghe), who was so kind to travel by motorbike to meet the MTR Team in Mazonde, as the MTR team could not travel to the Ngandja reserve due to security concerns.
- In-person meetings with the **provincial Mministry of Environment in Tanganyika** (his Excellency Minister Norris Mulongoy Mutamba).
- The p**rovincial coordinator of the national Ministry of the Environment** (Andre Matala), which oversees the Luama Katanga reserve as no ICCN team has been allocated to this reserve yet.
- Many in-person meetings with the Kalemie team of the **responsible partner (RP) WCS**, specifically the Project Manager Sadjina Nadjiadoum, Deputy Project Manager Fidele Amsini Mutuza, Biomonitoring Manager Benjamin Wilondja Kitamya, Livelihood Manager Jacques Mwetaminwa Mashimango, Financial Manager Serges Itungulu Nabo and online with the Technical Director for Rights and Communities, Margit Bertalan. As WCS was not able to organize a meeting and/or online discussion with WCS's Grievance Redress Team and its Monitoring and Evaluation Team between January 1 and March 30, 2026, while the

MTR Review Team several time requested to have these meetings in writing, we assume that these teams do not exist.

- In-person meeting with fifteen members of the **Comité local de Governance (CLG)** under the leadership of Modeste Kabazi, which has been set up by WCS to establish and manage the Kabobo-Luamba protected areas, and kindly facilitated meetings with three local communities in Barwani, Kamanya Kabwa and Mizimwe.
- In-person meeting with the **network of Batwa communities (REPALEF)** in the Tanganyika province coordinated by Benjamin Mulezi Wa Banze, and over the phone with REPALEF in South Kivu Provinces coordinated by Esperance Nyota who connected us with Batwa from the communities in and around the Ngandja reserve. REPALEF Tanganika delegated Tambwe Kvta to facilitate our engagements with the Batwa population in Lugogo II, Barwani and Kamanya Kabwa. The MTR team hired him to organize the meetings, translate the conversations and is tasked to provide feedback to the community members on the outcome of this MTR.
- In-person meetings with **three local Bantu communities in Barwani, Kamanya Kabwa and Mizimwe**. The communities were informed about the meeting and the objectives of the meeting before the meeting and at the beginning of the meeting to ensure their meaningful, effective and informed participation and to provide them with opportunities to express their views at all points of the project and/or project decision-making process on matters that affect them. These meetings were conducted without the presents of representatives from the government including but not limited ICCN, WCS and/or UNDP, though in some meetings people, who serve on the Comité de Conservation Communautaire (CCC), the local GRM committee etc. participated in their capacity as community members. The engagement always followed the requirements outlined in UNDP's SES specifically the provisions on page 68 and we made sure that we obtained responses from those people that do serve on one of the WCS-led committees and/or interact with WCS and/or ICCN on a regular and/or financial basis.
- In-person meetings with the **Batwa population in Lugogo II, Barwani and Kamanya Kabwa.** In line with SES 6 para 10, 11 and 15, the MTR Team informed the Batwa in these three settlements about the MTR mission, its objective etc. ahead of the field mission through REPALEF and did so again before starting the engagements. The MTR Team clarified to those participating, in Batwa language, that they always have the option to not engage with the team and/or to ask for a different setting, for time to consult among themselves before answering, etc. The engagements themselves were organized and performed with the help of a Tambwe Kvta, a Twa who was delegated by REPALEF and did all the interpreting. While organizing the meeting, Mr Kvta asked women and girls as well as vulnerable and marginalized Batwa whether they preferred to have separate meetings but learned that the participating Batwa preferred to discuss all issues together. As the Batwa are traditionally an egalitarian society with consensual decision-making structures, this seems in line with cultural norms and practice. We also observed that the participating Batwa asked Batwa that work for the project to leave the room and/or not to answer on behalf of the participants. At times, Mr Kvta asked the Batwa whether they wanted to discuss something among themselves before providing feedback, which at some points they did before responding. Towards the end of these culturally appropriate consultations, we repeated all information noted down during the meeting and asked the participating Batwa whether they consent with this information and/or whether they agreed or disagreed with anything and/or whether other information should be added. Mr Kvta is tasked to inform the Batwa that participated in the meeting about the outcomes of the MTR and collect for that purpose the telephone numbers of all participating Batwa that have a telephone. While the first meeting in Lugogo II was conducted without any Bantu nearby i this was a bit more challenging during the two other meetings that were, due to heavy rains, conducted in the only covered meeting places that serve also as church, school, guesthouse, etc. While we asked all Bantu to leave the room, a request the Bantu population kindly followed despite the rains, at times people entered the hall and where then asked to leave and/or sit at the other end of the hall to not disturb the meeting after the participating Batwa indicated that this was OK with them. The national MTR Review consultant did not participate in the meetings with the Batwa as he is Bantu.

One methodological challenge for the allocation of benefits and impacts to the UNDP-GEF Project is that WCS receives for its activities in the landscape, besides the funding from the UNDP-GEF Project, funds from a large number of other financial partners. These include, but are not limited to, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID, until 2025), the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (until 2025), the Bezos Earth Fund, the Arcus Foundation, the Jane Goodall Institute, the Earth Foundation etc. While the MTR Team asked WCS for consolidated annual audits that show the budget allocations of each financial partners against expenditures that relates to or could relate to the activities under the GEF-funded project, in order to track financing and allocate benefits and impacts, the financial plans provided seem to suggest that all activities were entirely financed by GEF.











3. Project Description and Background Context

The Kabobo-Luama Landscape, which contains the Kabobo Wildlife Reserve (147,710 ha), the Luama-Katanga Hunting Reserve (230,351 ha), and the Ngandja Wildlife Reserve (289,244 ha), is located on the western shore of Lake Tanganyika in the DRC. It forms part of the Albertine Rift, one of Africa's most biodiverse regions and a global biodiversity hotspot and covers a mosaic of ecosystems including miombo woodlands, montane and sub-montane forests, grasslands, wetlands, and freshwater systems. The landscape provides vital ecosystem services for 120 communities including forty-six communities of the indigenous Batwa.

The 120 communities living in and around the landscape depend heavily on natural resources for subsistence and income. Fisheries and logging dominate livelihoods along Lake Tanganyika, while inland communities rely primarily on hunting, gathering of forest and non-forest products, agriculture, herding, and artisanal mining. Decades of conflict and neglect have degraded basic infrastructure, with limited access to potable water, schools, health services, education, and markets. Poverty levels are severe, and food insecurity is widespread.

The landscape is inhabited by diverse ethnic groups that include indigenous Batwa, which traditionally are hunter-gatherers, Banyamulenge, which traditionally are semi-mobile pastoralists, and several agricultural Bantu communities that include the following ethnolinguistic groups: a) Batabwa, dominating the lakeshores, b) Balumbwe/Tumbwe and Bahemba, dominating inland lowlands and c) Babembe, dominating the northern areas towards Fizi and the Ngandja–Kabobo mountain ranges. Comparison of historic and present ethnographic data suggests that the growing Babembe presence in the southern part of the landscape is a recent phenomenon that might be the result of a history of rebellions, conflicts, and migration from the Rwanda-Burundi highlands. The area also hosts various migrant populations including internal refugees that moved to the area to avoid conflicts and to have, via the RN5, at least some access to modern services and markets. Social, often armed, tensions exist around land tenure, access to resources, and competition between long-standing residents and migrants. Women and indigenous groups are disproportionately affected by insecurity, environmental degradation, and limited access to land, services, and decision-making processes.

Governance capacity in the region is weak. ICCN, the statutory authority responsible for protected areas, lacks resources and presence in the landscape, with some reserves having no permanent management since the mid-1990s. Provincial environmental institutions are newly established (following the creation of Tanganyika Province in 2015) and remain under-resourced and inexperienced in conservation and integrated landscape management.

Traditional governance systems and customary land management systems persist but are under strain due to demographic change, migration, and increasing pressure on land and resources. Since the 1970s traditional authorities have become more and more absorbed by local governments with chiefs being appointed by the government and used as auxiliaries. As a consequence, the higher-level chiefs ("Grand Chef de la chefferie" and "chefs de groupement") mostly live in the urban centers with little or no contact with the population they officially rule.

The project focuses on the Kabobo-Luama Landscape including buffer zones, ecological corridors, and community lands. Activities span both Tanganyika and South Kivu Provinces, with site-specific interventions adapted to ecological and socio-cultural contexts. "In 2009, WCS and ICCN held meetings with the traditional chiefs (Mwamis) of the villages in both Katanga and South Kivu to … discuss options for the conservation of the region's biodiversity. At both meetings, the Mwamis voted to create a National Park in the region to be called Ngamikka Park (after Nganja, Misotshi, Kabogo cultural sites in the massif). Since that time, WCS has been working with each of the village councils … to map where the boundaries of the park should be as well as buffer zones and village expansion areas for agriculture. Villages in the Lubondja groupment in the northeast are the only villages that WCS has not been able to access as Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) rebels have stationed themselves there and it is too insecure to visit. Despite this inability to visit these villages, the Chief of these villages has given his consent to the creation of the park. In addition, along the road between Kalemie and Fizi, 253 pygmies have been consulted" (WCS 2013: Establishment and Management of

the Itombwe Massif and Misotshi-Kabogo as New Protected Areas in the DRC https://www.cepf.net/resources/documents/involuntary-resettlement-safeguard-13). While WCS deploys local "monitors" to monitor and protect the area, the ProDoc noted that several aspects regarding their operations need to be elaborated, particularly their mandate regarding law enforcement, their relationship with the communities, and the supporting financial model.

The project is designed to respond to a set of interrelated environmental, institutional, and socio-economic challenges threatening biodiversity and human development. Direct threats to biodiversity include unregulated hunting and bushmeat trade, unsustainable fishing practices, artisanal mining, forest exploitation, agricultural encroachment, and uncontrolled pastoralism. Climate change exacerbates these pressures, with forecasts indicating increased rainfall variability, erosion, landslides, and further habitat loss, threatening species with narrow ecological tolerances. In turn, local livelihoods experience significant pressure from wildlife in combination with a hunting ban enforced by state actors (ICCN, provincial fisheries and wildlife services, local governments, chiefs), and conservation NGOs (WCS, etc.). While this was anticipated in the project design, the project failed to deliver the social infrastructure, transportation, markets, value addition, and adequate and modern governance and participation in decision making on the resources they depend upon that was agreed upon when establishing the reserves and foreseen as mitigation- and offset-measures in the project design.

The project identified four core barriers:

1. Insufficient institutional capacity for integrated landscape and protected area management at national, provincial, and local levels.
2. Weak protected area governance and enforcement, with limited staffing, infrastructure, and community involvement.
3. Low socio-economic development, limited livelihood enhancement potentials, and food insecurity, driving unsustainable exploitation of natural resources.
4. Weak knowledge management and gender mainstreaming, limiting adaptive management, learning, and equitable participation.

Underlying these barriers are unresolved land tenure conflicts, limited recognition of indigenous and human rights, inadequate participation of women and marginalized groups, and fragile security conditions.

In that perspective, the project's objective is to strengthen the participatory management of the Kabobo-Luama landscape, enhance the conservation of endangered species, and foster sustainable development. This objective is pursued through an integrated, human-rights-based approach that respects the Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of indigenous and local communities and balances conservation with development needs. Expected outcomes include improved management effectiveness across the three protected areas, reduced deforestation and poaching, restored habitat connectivity, increased populations of key species, restored and improved livelihoods, participatory governance, and tangible social development.

The project strategy is structured around four mutually reinforcing components:

Output 1: Institutional capacity development for landscape governance, planning, and enforcement.

Output 2: Enhanced protected area management, including zoning, infrastructure development, surveillance, and biodiversity monitoring.

Output 3: Sustainable livelihood development, promoting conservation-compatible income generation, sustainable land management, and reduced dependence on extractive practices.

Output 4: Safeguards, knowledge management, and learning, ensuring social and environmental risk management, gender mainstreaming, and dissemination of lessons learned.

The project is implemented under UNDP National Implementation Modality, with ICCN as IP and WCS as RP providing their long-standing technical expertise in the landscape. A Project Board provides strategic oversight, comprising representatives from national and provincial ministries, ICCN, UNDP, key development partners, and civil society. The Board should meet regularly to review progress, approve work plans, and ensure alignment with national priorities. Under the supervision of the Board, a Project Management Unit (PMU) should oversee day-to-day implementation, monitoring, and reporting.

At local level, a multi-tiered system of community conservation and governance committees, which is let by the Comité Local de Gouvernance (CLG), brings together the Comité de gouvernance pour la conservation communautaire (CGCC) and the Comité Local de Conservation (CLC). The CLG is supervised by the Governor, the Minister of the Environment and the Environmental Coordinator and is tasked to facilitate participatory decision-making processes, conflict resolution, and benefit-sharing. The present structure was set up in 2008 by WCS and ICCN as Comité de Coordination de Site and assembles 120 local and 30 higher-level chiefs.

The project is to be implemented over a five-year period (6/2022-6/2027) with the following milestones:

- Within the first six months of implementation, the project was tasked to establish a safeguard package consisting of an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), an Environmental & Social Management Plan (ESMP), Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM), Resettlement Action Plan (RAP), Livelihood Action Plan (LAP), Indigenous Peoples Plan (IPP), Migration Management Plan (MMP), Biodiversity Action Plan (BAP), Health and Safety Plan (HSP) and updated Stakeholder Engagement Plan (SEP) and Gender Action Plan (GAP). As per UNDP transparency and accountability standards, safeguards related information as well as stakeholder engagement and FPIC protocols and documentation should be publicly disclosed. The implementation of these safeguard instruments is a prerequisite before project activities are implemented.
- Based on the finalized safeguard package and the enhanced capacities of all stakeholders, landscape and protected area management plans (PAMP) should be developed before the end of year 1 in an inclusive process using participatory land use mapping etc. These PAMPs should then guide the implementation of Components 2 and 3.
- The MTR was scheduled to be conducted in late 2024.
- In year 4, after the MTR, when opportunities and risks were (re)assessed based on pilot livelihood enhancement projects and bio-monitoring, a business plan should be developed as a complementary measure to the PAMPs to provide i) an analysis of challenges and opportunities for PA management; ii) a strategy to generate sustainable funding flows; iii) design for the institutional setup required for transparent financial management; iv) a Benefit-Sharing Plan according to national REDD+ standards. The business plan should be linked to the Livelihood Restoration Plan (LRP) to align social development with the gradual implementation of the PAMPs to ensure compliance with the “do-no-harm” objective of the project.
- The Terminal Evaluation is scheduled for January 2027.
- Monitoring and evaluation are embedded throughout project implementation, with adaptive management informed by participatory monitoring systems.

Key stakeholders include:

- National institutions: Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development; ICCN
- Provincial authorities: Tanganyika and South Kivu provincial ministries
- Local communities: Batwa indigenous peoples, Bantu communities, farmers, fisherfolk, pastoralists, women, and youth groups
- Civil society organizations: local NGOs and community-based organizations
- International partners: UNDP, GEF, WCS, and other development partners
- Regional and thematic initiatives: REDD+, Global Wildlife Program, Lake Tanganika Biodiversity Initiative etc.

The partners agreed to allocate USD 11.5 million for the project

FINANCING PLAN	
GEF Trust Fund	USD 3,730,734
Confirmed cash co-financing to be administered by UNDP	USD 300,000
(1) Total Budget administered by UNDP	USD 4,030,734
FURTHER CO-FINANCING	
Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development	USD 6,000,000
Ministry of Environment Tanganyika Province	USD 1,000,000

Wildlife Conservation Society	USD 400,000
(2) Total co-financing	USD 7,400,000
(3) Grand-Total Project Financing: (1) + (2)	USD 11,430,734

SES Risks: This project is categorized as **High Risk** per the SESP with the key risks being a) the economic displacement of local communities and indigenous people; b) the physical displacement of non-right holding settlers from the reserves, c) exacerbating existing land- and resource related conflicts, d) reproducing and exacerbating discrimination against indigenous people and UNDP's risk-register further notes that "the RP WCS has been accused of having violated human rights while working in protected areas in Africa." Compliance with the risk management tools (safeguard package) and UNDP's SES shall be monitored.



ICCN Office in Kalemie, and the project side in Mazonde above and Office of the CLG below.



4. Findings

4.1. Project Strategy

The **Project Design**, as outlined in the ProDoc, is rather ambitious. With a budget of USD 11.5m the Project should overcome long-standing challenges related to natural resource and land management, foster environmental-sound social development, solve decade-old conflicts, modernize governance etc., and transform the landscape, which is larger than the State of Palestine and home to 120 villages, into a shining example of sustainable development. The ProDoc correctly identifies the main barriers and develops a reasonable theory of change around the following four pathways: (i) enhanced institutional capacities; (ii) participatory management of protected areas; (iii) social development and alternative environmentally sustainable livelihoods that outcompete the economic drivers of deforestation and biodiversity loss; and (iv) rapid knowledge sharing and learning by all key stakeholders.

One challenge may be resolving from the page-limitation for the ProDoc, is that in the ~300-words description of each pathway and the ~800-words outline of each component remains rather generic and kicked the can of a more detailed description of how this should be achieved down the road to implementation.

Another challenge is that the ProDoc assumes that 56% of the overall budget is provided by the Government of the DRC (GoDRC) and one might need to ask whether UNDP adequately considered the vast amount of literature that suggests that the GoDRC faced significant challenges to deliver committed counterpart funds in time (see for example: Williams, G.: 2013: Donor Approaches to Risk in Fragile and Conflict Affected States Case Study Democratic Republic of Congo). Based on this well documented risk and to avoid adjusting projects during implementation to reflect delayed/non-delivered counterpart funds, the AfDB no longer includes counterpart funds in projects in the DRC (AfDB 2024: Evaluation of Counterpart Funding at the African Development Bank Group). It should however be noted that the Provincial Government of Tanganika delivered some counter-part funds through the in-kind contribution of a plot for the office to manage the landscape. It should also be noted that the ProDoc addresses this risk to some extent by limiting the budget allocated to the RP to 78% of the GEF project grant. However, one then needs to ask whether USD 2.9m was sufficient to enable WCS to deliver the following outputs: a) guide the development of integrated landscape planning to counter habitat degradation (Outputs 1.1, 1.2, 1.4), b) support the further development of conservation governance in the landscape involving the elaboration of community-based conservation management (Output 1.3, 2.3), c) support the installation and operation of ICCN in the Kabobo-Luama landscape (output 2.2, 2.3, 2.4), d) support ICCN in the development of conservation surveillance and monitoring of the landscape (Output 2.3, 2.5), e) carry out surveys and research in the landscape (biodiversity, socio-economy, environment, etc.) in collaboration with partners (Output 2.1), f) support the development of sustainable livelihoods for communities (Outputs 3.1, 3.2, 3.3), g) ensure the implementation of environmental and social safeguards (Output 4.1) and h) assist the project monitoring, evaluation, learning and communication activities (Outputs 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4).

The **Results Framework** echoes the assertive approach of the overall ProDoc and introduces elaborate indicators with extremely optimistic targets (see below). These prospects are coupled with a high SES and operational risk rating and therefore require a regular and comprehensive monitoring system. The ProDoc provides a detailed monitoring plan with a budget of USD 0.2m and significant parts of UNDP's counterpart financing and clarified that "the UNDP Country Office is responsible for ensuring full compliance with all UNDP project monitoring, quality assurance, risk management, and evaluation requirements." Under UNDP's supervision the RP's Component four, managers shall keep track of the number of individuals benefitting from targeted project activities, specifying gender, place, and type of benefit. Data will be aggregated by the Component 4 manager and reported in activity reports, PIRs and evaluation reports. Unfortunately, WCS's M&E Manager was not available for discussion during the mission nor in the three weeks after the mission. The latest officially submitted activity report covers Q1/2025 with a draft informally shared for Q2/2025. Both focus on biomonitoring and do not measure

progress as indicated in the project results framework i.e., progress against the agreed indicators.

The Project Implementation Report (PIR) 2024faced challenges to report progress against the indicators of the results framework as other than ecological monitoring, implementation had not started. The PIR 2024 reports that "there have been delays in starting the safeguards work and challenges with ensuring that all SES risks are fully assessed in line with both Government and UNDP SES risk management requirements. An ESIA was commissioned by the IP, but this has not addressed all requirements as per the SESP and ESMF and an action plan will be required to address the gaps and policy misalignments. Importantly, a rapid assessment will need to be conducted - preferably by a SES expert – (which will indicate) which activities can proceed before any additional SES management plans are developed and which (activities) may be further delayed whilst the assessments and plans are completed." As the Project started on June 10, 2022, with USD 358,459 having been disbursed prior to July 31, 2024. The UNDP's CO rated the project progress as "satisfactory" and why the UNDP BPPS Technical Advisor rated the project as "moderately satisfactory."

The PIR 2025 suggests in the reporting on the indicators of the results framework that there are language/conceptual challenges for the project team to capture the difference between direct and indirect beneficiaries etc. and that the project team was unfamiliar with UNDP's Institutional Capacity Development Scorecard. In sum, progress has been rated as "Moderately Unsatisfactory," largely because the limited progress made to enhance the quality of the safeguard package and bring the project back into compliance with the SESP.

The MTR Team notes that neither the activity reports nor the PIR operationalize the results framework or its indicators, and that nearly 4 years after the start of the projects for many progress indicators no baseline data have been established. This seems to suggest that the results framework and its indicators as presented in the ProDoc was not commensurate with the capacities of the implementing partners. This mismatch constrained this MTR as one of its key elements is to verify the reported progress against the results framework indicators and recommends actions for those parameters where the progress is behind expectations.

4.2. Progress Towards Results

4.2.1. Progress towards outcomes analysis

UNDP's guideline for MTRs suggests that this analysis should be "based on data provided, amongst others, in the ProDoc, project work plans, GEF Tracking Tools, and PIRs, as well as results verified in the course of the MTR mission." However, when commencing the MTR in January 2026, the MTR Team noted that the latest submitted project progress report was from Q1/2025, that the Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (METT) for the landscape and three protected areas and the UNDP Institutional Capacity Development Scorecard have not been updated since the ProDoc while this was required to be done in preparation of the MTR. In conclusion, the following section uses the information obtained during the MTR mission and remains narrative as the project did not provide the data needed to utilize the quantitative approach normally used in MTRs.

4.2.1.1. Overall progress

Monitoring	Indicators	Targets (MTR Mid-term/ TE Terminal Evaluation)
Overall outcome: Strengthen the management of the Kabobo-Luama protected area landscape and enhance conservation of endangered species for local sustainable development and global biodiversity benefits.	Indicator 1 (GEF Core Indicator 11): # Direct project beneficiaries disaggregated by gender (individual people).	MTR : Total 15,000. W 7,500 / M 7,500 TE : Total 7,500. W 3,750 / M 3,750
	Indicator 2: Indirect project beneficiaries disaggregated by gender (individual people).	MTR : Total 37,500. W 18,750 / M 18,750 TE : Total 76,758. W 38,359 / M 38,359
	Indicator 3: (GEF Core Indicator 1.2): Terrestrial protected areas under improved management effectiveness (hectares)	MTR: 667,305 ha TE: 667,305 ha
	Indicator 4 (GEF Core Indicator 4.1): Area of landscapes under improved management to benefit biodiversity (qualitative assessment, non-certified)	MTR: 154,000 ha TE: 154,000 ha

In response to indicator 1 and 2, the draft PIR 2025 suggests that by June 30, 2025, "368 people, including 226 men and 142 women were educated on the importance of preserving biodiversity." While this is a useful information, indicators 1 and 2 refer, according to the ProDoc, to the

"number of individuals (disaggregated by gender) directly/indirectly benefiting from targeted support of activities under components 1-4". The response provided in the PIR 2025 seems to suggest that the project is largely a conservation project, while the project, as outlined in chapter 3, entails three impact chains: a) enhance the capacities of all stakeholders to enable them to design and implement management plans for the landscape and the three protected areas in a participatory manner, b) enhance local livelihoods to outcompete the economic drivers of deforestation, biodiversity loss etc. and c) enhance biodiversity conservation in line with the participatory management plans. From that perspective, being educated on the importance of preserving biodiversity does not necessarily make someone a beneficiary of the project and does not demonstrate that these people benefited from all four activities.

This mismatch is quite symptomatic for the activities put in place to date and suggests that the project team might need some more time to align themselves with the objectives of the project, specifically the social development and livelihood component as well as the capacity enhancement component. The objective of the capacity enhancement component is to enable the local population in the 120 villages to actively and meaningfully participate in the preparation and implementation of management plans for the landscape and the protected area and not just to listen to lectures. This also becomes clear when looking at the progress reported in the Draft PIR 2025 on indicator 3 and 4. While the indicators 3 and 4 are, according to the ProDoc, linked to the implementation status of the participatory management plans for the landscape and the three protected areas, the Draft PIR 2025 reports that "105.43 ha, or 15.8% of the landscape's forest cover (667,305 ha) have been reported as being at risk of deforestation" (see also WCS 7/2024: Rapport semestriel de suivi des changements dans la couverture forestière du paysage Kabobo) . Besides the arithmetic error, the response provided has no relationship with these two indicators. The ProDoc suggests that these indicators should report progress against the METT benchmark assessment that "has been completed in the METT workshop during the PPG phase and will be completed again before MTR". While the ProDoc entails METT baseline data in Annex 12, the MTR team could not find any evidence that the tool has been consistently used to assess the quality of the draft management plans and/or performance and were not provided with an updated METT assessment.

While METT is a rather hands-on tool that is generally used to ensure alignment between various stakeholders, the project conducted in December 2023 a workshop using IUCN's Integrated Management Effectiveness Tool (IMET). While both tools are aligned with the IUCN WCPA framework for evaluating the six key elements of management (context, planning, inputs, process, outputs, and outcomes), the 2023 IMET is not aligned with the METT data in the ProDoc, has not been followed up, and seems to have been conducted solely with ICCN and WCS staff. In sum, its value for the project seems questionable and its recommendations, to enhance conservation, while not even mentioning the rural development and livelihood improvement objectives of the project, is of limited value to the project. While an updated METT as a GEF core indicator is needed, the project did not provide it and the 2023 IMET can not substitute it. To bridge the data gap, the MTR Team established a rapid update of the METT presented in the ProDoc (see separate Annex) that tries to overcome the shortcomings as much as possible but can obviously not reach the same level of depth as the standalone METT assessment, the project should have established in preparation of the MTR.

4.2.1.2. Outcome 1: Improved management of the Kabobo-Luama Protected Area Landscape

Monitoring	Indicators	Targets (MTR Mid-term/ TE Terminal Evaluation)
Project Outcome 1: Improved management of the Kabobo-Luama Protected Area Landscape	Indicator 5: Institutional capacity for landscape management as measured per UNDP Institutional Capacity Development Scorecard.	Baseline : Cr1 = 58%, Cr2 = 55%, Cr3 = 56%, Cr4 = 67%, Cr5 = 44%, Total Avge 56% MTR: + 10% & TE: + 25 %
	Indicator 6: Populations of key species (Bongo, Buffalo, Chimpanzee, Colobus, Elephant) monitored using direct and indirect encounter rates from SMART (observation/km covered).	MTR: Increased by 10% each sub-indicator TE: Increased by 30% each sub-indicator
	Indicator 7: Connectivity between the Kabobo-Luama protected areas, as measured by encounter rates of indicator species (chimpanzees, elephants, red colobus) per km covered by patrols in the corridor areas (SMART surveillance data)	MTR: 30% of corridors are used by indicator species TE: 60% of corridors are used by indicator species

Industrial best practice suggests that participatory natural resource management needs to centre on empowering stakeholders, especially local communities and indigenous peoples, to collaboratively manage resources through inclusive decision-making, transparent communication, and shared responsibility. Key elements consequently include collaborative planning (mapping/design), building on local knowledge, equitable benefit-sharing, and active monitoring. In this perspective the ProDoc tasked the project to first establish the safeguard framework under component 4 and identify gap filling measures to enable vulnerable and marginalised people to meaningful participate in the elaboration and implementation of the participatory management plans for the overall landscape and the three protected areas. It is evident that a fully participatory management plan cannot be developed before a) the Batwa, whose livelihoods depend on hunting and gathering of NTFPs, as well as other groups such as those that b) depend on natural resources exploitation, c) are at risk of being economically displaced, d) live or lived in the core protection zones of the proposed protected areas and therefore at risk of being physical displaced and e) marginalised groups such as women, the youth etc. are capable of participating meaningfully in this planning and decision making processes. Therefore, the finalisation of the safeguard package is instrumental also for any implementation of activities and progress under component 1.

For stakeholder engagement, capacity enhancement and ensuring/documenting FPIC, WCS presently uses written agreements in French with the chefs, which are installed by the government and often don't live in the 120 villages, in a landscape where the literacy rate is below 10% and hardly anybody in the villages speaks French. While there might have been limited alternatives during the initial engagements in the establishment of the protected areas between 2007 and 2016, the ProDoc tasked the project under component 1.3. to widen the engagement and capacity enhancement and clarifies that "members of these committees are (to be) nominated by local communities and are expected to effectively represent the interests of stakeholder groups at community level including customary chiefs, Batwa, Bantu, women, youth, hunters and fishermen. … Effective and efficient performance of the committees will be achieved through a participatory process to determine governance rules, and by building capacity of the committee's members through training in, among others: leadership (women, communities), sustainable land-use, conservation, human-wildlife conflict management, participatory governance, environmental law, etc. The quality of the participation will be monitored in order not to have silent representatives endorsing men's interests or Bantu women interests to the detriment of others. Participation of illiterate representatives to the governance committee will also be enabled to ensure participation of the most vulnerable stakeholders." In this perspective, it is worrying that WCS's regional safeguard staff considers the original approach to be in line with UNDP's SES, while contemporary social studies[4] suggest that this approach has been outdated at least since the early 2000s, and that the Batwa as an egalitarian society have no rulers and are not represented by the Bantu chiefs. The ProDoc and UNDP's SES clarifies that far reaching decisions such as demarcating and zoning of protected areas require the meaningful and informed participation of all affected people and the FPIC of all indigenous Batwa and can not be achieved and/or documented by relying on the concept of indirect rule through government-installed chiefs introduced during colonial rule and perpetuated under the Mobutu regime.

While the RP's "technical data sheets for field activities 2025-2026" foresees for the area in and around the Kabobo-Luama Protected Areas a) the elaboration of a capacity enhancement plan for the local communities based on a training need assessment to be conducted in a participatory process in Q2 and Q3/2025, b) the establishment of a capacity enhancement plan for the local authorities to be conducted in Q3 and Q4/2025, and c) the active participation of both groups in

[4] See for example: Soeren J. Henn, Gauthier Marchais, Christian Mastaki Mugaruka, and Raúl Sánchez de la Sierra 2024: Indirect rule: armed groups and customary chiefs in eastern DRC. WIDER Working Paper 2024/18. Hoffmann, K., Vlassenroot, K., & Mudinga, E. 2020: Courses au pouvoir: the struggle over customary capital in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 14(1), 125–144.

the implementation of the management plan for the Kabobo-Luama landscape, these activities seem to not have started to date.

The final deliverable of this component, the participatory landscape management plan (Plan d'Aménagement et de Gestion du paysage Kabobo Luama), which has not been shared with the MTR Team, has been drafted without benefiting from the finalised safeguard package (see component 4) and the capacity enhancement to be delivered under component 1.2 and 1.3. Despite the absence of these baseline information and participatory land use maps, ICCN's Technical and Scientific Department conducted two planning missions (July 2 to 19, 2024 and September 17 to 29, 2024). A third and final mission scheduled for 2025 has been delayed twice and is presently earmarked to be conducted based on the outcomes of the MTR. We highly recommend that this mission is further delayed until the affected people are able to meaningfully participate in its elaboration and the Batwa provided their FPIC to the engagement method to be outlined in a revised and significantly enhanced IPP:

Whether the draft landscape management plan delivers on the objectives outlined in the ProDoc and specifically provides an agreed approach on how to manage human-wildlife conflicts outside the core protection areas remains unknown as none of the project partners provided the MTR Team with a copy of this draft while it was formally requested from each of the parties.

With a view on indicator 5, the ProDoc informs that the "UNDP Institutional Capacity Development Scorecard has been completed during the PPG phase and will be completed again within 3 months before MTR in a stakeholder workshop." This did not happen. The MTR team repeated the scoring based on its interviews with the various stakeholder and against the baseline data presented in Annex 16 of the ProDoc. As a result, the systematic, institutional and individual capacities of the project partners to 1) conceptualize and formulate policies, legislations, strategies and programmes, 2) implement policies, legislation, strategies and programmes, 3) engage and build consensus among all stakeholders, 4) mobilize information and knowledge and 5) monitor, evaluate, report and learn was found to be below 50% across the board and therefore lower than the baseline rating provided in the ProDoc. The assessment certainly did not demonstrate the envisaged 10% improvement to be achieved at the time of the MTR.

The main shortcoming is that to date UNDP's CO, ICCN, WCS and the local population find it challenging to work in coordination and that specifically UNDP's CO seems to consider itself not to be in charge of quality assurance, oversight, supervision and monitoring to ensure that the project is being carried out in accordance with the ProDoc, the agreed standards, GEF project cycle management, and ensuring the most efficient and effective use of the GEF grants.

One example is the absence of a coordinated effort to manage the Ngandja Reserve:

- It seems evident that at the time of the project inception workshop in 2022 the partners knew that a) the Cosma Foundation had ceased to exist, if it ever had existed, after the former Head of ICCN, Cosma Wilungula, had been removed from office in July 2021, b) ICCN had deployed a team of 30 eco-guards to Ngandja in 2020, c) WCS had been active in the area around the reserve since 2007, and d) the area is and was safe to work in (ICCN 2025: Reserve de faune de Ngandja: Rapport etat de lieux 2025).
- In this situation, the Project Board could have deployed a) WCS's team to Ngandja to establish the safeguard instruments to assure that ICCN's on-the-ground conservation and enforcement efforts are aligned with UNDP's SES based on the risk assessment in the ProDoc and SESP, b) facilitated some initial capacity enhancement to enable ICCN's team to comply with them, c) provide ICCN with the necessary logistics to conduct their work and d) focus implementation of component 1 and 3 on that area to align ICCN's efforts with the capacity enhancement of all stakeholders to enable the participatory management of the reserve and local development initiatives to deliver on the objectives of the GEF-funded project.
- In turn, and with reference to a concession agreement with the non-existent Cosma Foundation, UNDP and WCS limited its support to the Ngandja reserve to the topping up of salaries, three computers and a printer for a field office without electricity, three motorbikes

and one outboard motor for the 30 eco-guards. In addition to these 30 eco-guards on the payrole of ICCN, the local militia has provided ICCN with 30 additional eco-guards and takes care of their salaries etc. While UNDP's CO identified during their supervision mission in July 2024 that "the local communities were not involved in setting the boundaries of this reserve and are not involved in its management" (BTOR 8/2024), i.e. the project implemented in non-compliance with the approach outlined in the ProDoc and the SESP, this finding did not trigger any corrective action and/or update of the SESP and/or risk rating.

With a view on indicator 6 and 7, which aim to quantify the environmental benefits of the project, the reporting remains despite the biomonitoring, which WCS conducts since 2008 with a team of more than 20 peopleand various funds, at the level of activity monitoring.[5] When asked for the root-causes of this unsatisfactory use of funds for monitoring the MTR team heard various arguments that ranged from conspiracy theories that perceive WCS as a CIA cover agency to the structural misuse of funds with little or no actual biomonitoring carried out.

In sum, this means that to date it is unknown whether the law-enforcement conducted by ICCN's eco-guards in the Ngandja (now 60 people) and WCS's bio-monitoring teams (20 people) had resulted in an increased population of key species in the landscape and how UNDP's CO came to the conclusion in its Draft PIR 2025 that the progress against the indicators of Outcome 1 is "on track".

4.2.1.3. Outcome 2: Increased management effectiveness of Kabobo, Luama-Katanga, and Ngandja Reserves, with increased capacity to combat wildlife crime

Monitoring	Indicators	Targets (MTR Mid-term/ TE Terminal Evaluation)
Project Outcome 2: Increased management effectiveness of Kabobo, Luama-Katanga, and Ngandja Reserves, with increased capacity to combat wildlife crime	Indicator 8: Signature of provincial and national decrees affording upgraded protection status for the Kabobo and Ngandja Reserves.	MTR: National endorsement process started TE: National decree signed
	Indicator 9: PA Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (METT) scores	MTR: Kabobo: 40, Luama: 35, Ngandja: 35 TE: Kabobo: 60, Luama: 50, Ngandja: 50
	Indicator 10: Threat levels measured by encounter rates from SMART monitoring data for illegal activities (hunting, encroachment by mining and timber extraction) per km covered.	MTR level to be defined in first 6 months TE: Hunting: 0.1/km, Timber harvesting: 0.1/km Mining: 0.01/km, Agriculture: 0.002/km
	Indicator 11: Annual deforestation rates using globally available forest mapping sources indicated as percentage forest cover reduction per year	MTR: Kabobo: -10% Luama: -5% Ngandja: -10% TE: Kabobo: -30%, Luama: -20%, Ngandja: -30%

[5] See: WCS Proposal to CEPF 2010 DRC-62610: Establishment and management of the Itombwe Massif and Misotshi-Kabogo as a new protected areas in the Democratic Republic of Congo: 4; WCS 2016: CEPF Final Project Completion Report, and most recent: WCS 2026. Rapport annuel des activités de bio-monitoring dans le paysage Kabobo-Luana 1-12/2025.

As the ProDoc clarified that the Project builds on the successful work of WCS and ICCN in the area, it is helpful to look back to understand the approach and priorities of the project. Since 2008 WCS and ICCN are "working toward the establishment of a protected area in the Misotshi–Kabogo region. … The proposed protected area would be called Ngamikka National Park (taken from the local names Ngandja, Misotshi, Kabili, Kabobo), and it would include a core conservation area surrounded by a buffer zone where neighbouring communities would be able to access forest resources", (though) "agricultural activities should not be allowed in this buffer area." (Alec Crawford and Deo Kujirakwinja 2016: Migration and Conservation in the Misotshi–Kabogo Ecosystem: 6 & 13).




FIGURE 1: MAP OF MISOTSHI–KABOGO ECOSYSTEM AND PROPOSED NGAMIKKA NATIONAL PARK

"The formal protection of the Misotshi–Kabogo ecosystem is a crucial first step toward reducing the impacts of human migration on the forest and its wildlife." (ditto: 13). Until such "formal protection of the ecosystem is in place, local monitors, identified by customary chiefs and trained by WCS, collect biodiversity data, enabling a monitoring of human activities and of corresponding changes to the health of key species. WCS coordinates activities with the forestry department authorities to ensure that the country's forestry laws are enforced in those areas. .... Local chiefs are also involved in law enforcement activities for these areas. To support those community activities that will be implemented by WCS and ICCN in the area, local conservation committees have been established in villages surrounding the ecosystem." (ditto: 6).

As the project did not grant the request from the MTR team to share the draft decrees to update the conservation status of the reserves and/or the draft management plan for the landscape and/or the reserves, the MTR Team cannot evaluate what progress has been made since the start of this process in December 2016 when the Governor of the Tanganyika Province issued the provincial decree 0/060/CAB.GOUV/TANG/NKR/2016 that established Kabobo Wildlife Reserve with a surface area of 1,500 km^2 and the protection status of a national park. The MTR Team assumes that the indicator is related to the formal declaration of the area as national park; thus, the endorsement of the provincial decree from 2016 by the national government.

As indicated above, the project did not provide adequate and updated data that would facilitate quantifying progress made against the indicators related to output two. The MTR team, however, noted the following activities in the field:

Kabobo Luama site: Since 2008 WCS has operated twenty bio-monitors to collect data and, in the absence of ICCN eco-guards, conduct some low-level law enforcement by destroying traps, reporting people found in the reserve to the chief for punishment, and confiscating illegal products such as bushmeat, etc. While the monitoring element is fully in line with activity 2.1 (Monitoring biodiversity and habitat status and trends), the law enforcement part, though authorized by ICCN with reference to WCS' concession agreement, is a bit challenging as by law only eco-guards and environmental law enforcement officers by the national and provincial government are authorized to enforce laws. According to national laws, which were echoed in the ProDoc, law enforcement should be based on the management plans for the protected areas (activities 2.2 and 2.3) and aligned with the safeguard framework to ensure that adverse impacts are mitigated in line with the provisions of UNDP SES. Besides biomonitoring, which suggests slight improvement, another indirect indicator is the number of reported human wildlife conflicts where animals destroy crops etc. In all villages and settlements that MTR team visited, the participants report that these have increased over the years, which seems to suggest that the hunting pressure on animals has reduced. The local people also report that the ban to use traps to protect farms is largely respected, but indicates that the local acceptance of these conservation measures is reducing rapidly as to date no system to protect farms from wildlife through fences etc. and/or a system to compensate people for residual crop damage, while envisaged in national law and the ProDoc have not been established. The MTR team further learned that the Batwa in response to the agreement between ICCN, WCS and the local Bantu chiefs have since 2008 significantly reduced the number of hunting and gathering trips to the forested areas and became sedentary farmers that in the absence of available agricultural land largely work as day-laborers on the farms of the Bantu landowners. The MTR team further learned that the Batwa population in Kamanya Kabwa has been physically displaced from their original settlements in the Lama reserve and settled in 2013 in Kamanya Kabwa. This information was confirmed by the Bantus in Kamanya Kabwa. The challenge is that while physical displacement was envisaged to be managed in line with WCS involuntary resettlement policy (WCS 2013: https://www.cepf.net/resources/documents/involuntary-resettlement-safeguard-13) there are no indications that this process was followed. We finally learned from the Bantu and Batwa in most settlements we visited that the area available for agriculture is too small for local needs.




This seems true for Mizimwe, where the reserve boundary demarcation is located less than 2 km away from the village center and was established within existing farms. When asked why the participatory monitoring didn't allocate more farmland to the local people, the people indicated that they were not involved in any mapping. The chief reported that he had been outside the village and the boundary demarcation was signed by his chef de groupement without consulting him or the local population and that for years they had demanded an adjustment that, according to him, was rejected by WCS as the boundaries had been fixed for eternity in a participatory process and need to be accepted by everybody. When the MTR team asked ICCN and WCS whether they considered revisiting the boundary demarcation around Mzimwe they indicated that this is not within their mandate, which seems to be not aligned with the fact that participatory zoning is listed as activity 2.3.2. in the ProDoc.

With a view on the activities outlined in the contract between UNDP and WCS, the MTR team noted that in the latest activity report, WCS reported that implementation of activity 2.2. (national registration of the Kabobo and Ngandja reserve), 2.3. (participatory elaboration of a management plan for the three protected areas), 2.4 (enhancement of the infrastructure and equipment in the protected areas), and 2.5. (training of the eco-guards) is on hold as the ESMP/ESMS does not meet the requirements of UNDP's SES without any strategy on how to enhance the quality of the ESMP and the underlying safeguard documents. Despite these challenges and issues, the MTR team is of the view that while not overly effective and efficient,

not aligned with national laws and provisions, in non-compliance with UNDP's ESS and causing unmitigated harm to the local people WCS and ICCN's activities contribute to the conservation objectives of the project.

One driver of biodiversity loss and deforestation that seem not accurately assessed and considered in the project's conservation strategy is mining. In 2016, the Ministry of Mining issued a mining concession to the Bendera Mining Company Sarl that overlaps with the Kabobo reserve and even more the Luama reserve (see map). Bendera Mining is authorized to extract Gold, Silver, Cobalt, Copper, Tin, and Tantalum. In addition, ICCN reports that twenty-four artisanal mining sites are located in the Kabobo reserve and suggested that there seem to be even more in the Luama site.



To address these challenges WCS and ICCN conducted a press conference in January 2026, declaring Bendera's operations illegal and framed their activities within the global trade conflicts (https://fr.mongabay.com/2026/02/rdc-des-chinois-exploitent-illegalement-de-lor-dans-la-reserve-faunique-de-kabobo/). For the MTR Team, it remains unclear whether this is the most effective strategy to challenge a permit issued by the national Ministry of Mines and to convince artisanal miners to stop their activities. In other protected areas in the region, a close collaboration with mining concessions and artisanal miners resulted in a significant reduced use of pollutants such as mercury when provided with modern processing equipment etc.

The ProDoc considered the close cooperation between ICCN and WCS as the way forward with ICCN as the main implementing partner and WCS as partner responsible to enhance ICCN's capacities etc. to conduct their work in line with the approach outlined in the ProDoc. A key challenge is that the envisaged counterpart fund of USD 6m by the national Ministry of the Environment and USD 1m by the provincial government have not materialized and might not materialize in due time. To date, ICCN provides the base salary for the two staff deployed to Kalemie, but they have no office and no operational funds while WCS has provided ICCN's Kabobo team with two computers, two desks, two chairs, one motorbike, one backpack, and two

helmets. In this context, WCS presents itself and is perceived as being in charge with ICCN being a service provider that can conduct fieldwork only if this is approved and financed by WCS. This setting is suboptimal, and one might need to ask why the project board did not adjust the project's strategy when it became clear that the counterpart funds did not materialize in time.

It should be further noted that ICCN's local team indicated that to put in place an efficient and effective system to protect the core area of the Kabobo Reserve would require an initial investment of around USD 10m and an annual operational budget of USD 4m. To manage the Luama hunting reserve in line with national requirements, the provincial coordinator of the Ministry of Environment, which remains in charge until the protection status of the reserve is enhanced, indicated a budget need of USD 1.9m over the next three years. In sum, one notes that even if the counterpart funds would become available, these might be still insufficient to just pay for the work of ICCN let alone the budget needed for social development to outcompete the economic drivers of biodiversity loss and deforestation.

Ngandja Site: While the reserve was established in 1953, limited efforts went into its conservation until WCS engaged with the chiefs to establish the Ngamikka National Park. As this approach faced some challenges, the reserve was officially regazetted in June 2016 with the Foundation Cosma as concession owner and partner of ICCN. In contrast to the Kabobo Luama site, which is said to have no permanent settlements in its core protection area, there are a number of settlements of the Bafuriro, Banyindu and Bavira within the core protection area. In January 2020 ICCN transferred twenty-five eco-guards to the area, largely from the Kahuzi-Biega National Park, and hired thirty local eco-guards. Despite being part of the GEF Project, the ICCN team in Ngandja did not benefit from any support besides some salary toping up, three computers and one printer, four motorbikes and two outboard motors and therefore focused on ICCN's traditional approach of para-military law enforcement. To overcome financial challenges and the limited supply of rifles, the ICCN team engaged in early 2021 with General William Amuri Yakutumba, the leader of the National Coalition of the People for the Sovereignty of Congo, who agreed to cover the salaries for thirty local eco-guards in addition to the 30 paid by ICCN and threatens to execute gorilla or chimpanzee poachers. It should be noted that the European Union and United Kingdom placed sanctions on General Yakutumba in 2023 for his alleged role in violating international law and committing wartime sexual violence.

ICCN's Q2/2025 activity report informs that the eco-guards confiscated during these three months one rifle, three metal traps, one flesh, and game, forest and non-forest products from twenty-one people, destroyed twelve traps and burned down one settlement.





While not in line with UNDP's SES and/or the project as outlined in the ProDoc, these activities contribute to the conservation objectives of the project. It is unclear why the project board and/or UNDP's CO did not make more efforts to engage with the ICCN Ngandja team to ensure that their activities benefit from the technical and financial support channeled through WCS and therefore more aligned with the project's objectives of balancing conservation with social development. The annual operational budget needed by the ICCN Ngandja team to effectively conduct their work under component 2 is estimated by the Ngandja conservator to be USD 2m

and urgently needs to be aligned with UNDP's SES and aligned with the overall project approach; thus deployment of a WCS team to provide the much needed capacity enhancement, participatory management and social development work.

4.2.1.4. Outcome 3: Livelihood-driven threats to biodiversity within and around PAs reduced.

Monitoring	Indicators	Targets (MTR Mid-term/ TE Terminal Evaluation)
Project Outcome 3: Livelihood-driven threats to biodiversity within and around PAs reduced.	Indicator 12: Number of observed cases of unsustainable bushmeat hunting per km covered by patrolling (based on SMART surveillance data)	• MTR: 20% reduction • TE: 50% reduction
	Indicator 13: Household well-being measured by a modified Basic Necessities Survey BNS)	• MTR: 15% increase • TE: 30% increase
	Indicator 14: Number of households benefiting from income generation from alternative livelihood options introduced through the project	• MTR: M=200 W=250 • TE: M=250 W=500

One might argue that to some extent the framework for component 3 is set by the agreements between ICCN, WCS and the chiefs to protect the landscape. While the MTR Team did not obtain copies of the original agreement from 2008, we note that in the context of the validation workshop for the Conservation Plan for the landscape (Plan de conservation du paysage Kabobo Luama) on October 27/8 2015 the Tumbwe Paramount Chief with his 12 Chef des groupements pointed "out that conserving this landscape require the communities in the area to cease all exploitation activities while these activities are their main source of livelihood." To compensate/offset these losses, the chiefs recommended the

a) construction of schools, hospitals, roads, markets, and stadiums for the local communities,
b) construction of a bureau, guest house, and palace for each chief in the landscape,
c) provision of means of transportation and operational budget for each chief in recognition of their rights over the land that they have provided for conservation.
d) filling all positions in the landscape conservation project by people from the area.

While not an agreement in the legal sense, partly because the legal framework of the DRC does not consider the chiefs as owners of the land, in all meetings with Bantu communities we were told that this was promised by WCS/ICCN in response to the commitment of the chiefs to give their land for conservation and instruct their subjects to no longer enter the protected areas. It is important to note that the Batwa, while being an independent ethnic group, are in the context of these agreements considered as subjects of the Bantu chiefs.

While the ProDoc does not refer to these demands, the MTR Team noted during all community meetings, the chiefs and the local population expressed a growing frustration to further wait for these social development initiatives while being impacted by physical and economic displacement and by increased damages to their crops etc. by wildlife.

Before evaluating the progress made on indicator 13 and 14, it seems important to look at the impacts on local livelihoods before assessing whether these have been significantly enhanced:

Physical displacement: As indicated above, the Batwa, which reside today in Kangana Kabwa, indicated that they were told by the Bantu chiefs and WCS in 2013 to leave their old settlements in the Luama reserve and resettle to the roadside village. While we did not have the time and means to travel to the alleged old settlements to verify this by assessing the remains etc., their claim was confirmed by the Bantu population in Kangana Kabwa. According to the Batwa, they received no compensation and/or resettlement assistance to restore their living standards and livelihoods and/or any material for building huts and/or access to land to farm on. They claim that they don't have the means to rent land from the chief and therefore are forced to work as day-labourers on the farms of Bantu for a salary of around USD 1/day. When asked why they followed the request to leave their old settlements and move to the roadside, they referred to a long history of oppression and dependence on the Bantus to barter and trade bushmeat and NTFPs against agricultural products, salt etc. They reported incidences in the first years after their resettlement where people that went back to the reserve were reported to the Bantu chief and fined. Again,

we could not verify this information beyond a generic triangulation with the interviewed Bantus, which confirmed that anybody that is found in the core protection zone by the biomonitoring teams of WCS is fined and generally has to work for the chief free of charge. As this physical displacement appear to have happened to some extent in anticipation of WCS' landscape conservation programme, of which the GEF project was to become a key funding component , the MTR Team is of the view that this and similar cases of physical and economic displacement warrant further assessments in the context of the updated RAP/LRP that is needed to bring the project back into compliance with UNDP's SES.

Economic displacement: While talking with the Bantu population in Barwani, Kangana Kabwa and Mizimwe all people reported that the zoning and demarcation reduced the land available for agriculture (output 1.1). The level of concern varied between Mizimwe, where the boundaries were established within existing farms and hardly any arable land is left outside the core area, and Barwani, where the boundaries of the buffer zone and the reserve in which no agriculture is allowed are said to be at some distance from the existing farms and allows also new households to establish farms. When asked why they agreed during the participatory mapping and land use zoning to boundaries that limited the area available for agriculture, the participants were either not aware of such mapping and/or indicated that the demarcation was discussed and agreed between WCS and the higher-level chiefs (chef de groupement). This information was confirmed by the chief of Mizimwe and council members in the two other villages. All three villages indicated that they have submitted requests to revisit the boundaries through the grievance redress mechanism and have not heard back yet. When we asked ICCN and WCS, we were informed that the boundaries have been fixed by governmental decrees and therefore cannot be changed by the WCS and/or the local team of ICCN. As we could spend only a short period in each village due to the security concerns, we could not validate and/or quantify the income loss experienced by the households in result of their economic displacement. While all participants claimed that ICCN and WCS had committed to deliver the social infrastructure outlined in the 2015-request from the Paramount Chief, ICCN and WCS stated that such initiatives are outside their mandate and core competence. WCS indicated that they that are willing and capable to manage this and highlighted that under the USAID Telinde Project they rehabilitated the school in Logogo 2 but stated that such initiatives would need entirely financed by third parties and that in their recollection no such promises were made.

Income losses due to human wildlife conflicts: Bantu and Batwa participants voiced significant concerns about unmitigated and uncompensated crop destructions cased by wildlife in their farms. While staying at the camp in Mazonde, an upset man showed up and presented some cobs of corn that have been partly eaten by animals and requested compensation. When we asked this man as well as other than reported similar incidents why they do not protect their farms in the agricultural areas with traps etc., they told us that they were instructed by WCS's biomonitoring teams, chiefs and ICCN/WCS sensitization teams that all forms of hunting are prohibited and that putting traps even in farms could result in imprisonment. While nobody could provide any details on the alleged arrests, there were several people that could provide detailed recollections of incidents when the biomonitoring teams destroyed traps even in the farms and three people reported that the biomonitoring team confiscated animals that were trapped in their farms. Due to the limited time available in the villages, the MTR Team could not quantify the full replacement costs of the affected crops. However, a common perception among the participants was that on average animals destroy around 10-20% of their crops and that this number has increased over the years. In Bawani, where also the ordinary people were aware of the GRM, the participants indicated that they had submitted grievances related to these losses. This information was supported by WCS's GRM in-village team, which also confirmed that they had verified these claims and forwarded them to WCS some months ago. When asked about the outcomes, they indicated that they have not heard back for several months and that they don't know how grievances are treated at WCS or what response to expect. In Kangana Kabwa and Mizimwe the ordinary people were not aware of the GRM, while the chief of Mizimwe and council members in Kangana Kabwe were aware and indicated that they had submitted grievances. In both cases WCS's community monitors in charge of the

GRM indicated that they had verified the damages and send the complaint to WCS for review and consideration but have not heard back. In Barwani and Kangama Kabwe the Batwa we spoke to were not aware of the GRM and consequently have not submitted any grievance. In Logogo 2, the Batwa we spoke to stated that they heard about the GRM and had submitted some month ago 4 grievances via WCS's in-village GRM but that to date they were not granted with a response. When the team asked WCS for its strategy of how it plans to handle and respond to the grievances, and the grievance register, we were referred to the GRM Manager, who was on leave during the mission and not yet available for a discussion. Other WCS team members indicated that all grievances are forwarded to ICCN for review and consideration and that WCS only facilitates the interaction. When we asked ICCN of whether they have the mandate and/or funds to provide remedies if a reported crop destruction is indeed found to caused by wildlife, they indicated that they would love to as they understand the concern of the people, but stressed that they neither have the budget nor to date the mandate to disburse compensation as relevant legislation is pending. The MTR Team finds the approach to invite people to submit grievances without a clear process how to respond to justified claims rather risky as to leave people that made significant efforts to submit grievances without response and/or remedies will certainly not enhance the acceptability of the conservation objectives of the program and might undermine the long-term sustainability of the project.

Batwa: In all three Batwa communities (Logogo 1, Barwani and Kangama Kabwe) the participants informed the MTR Team that they had not been involved and/or aware of any discussions to protect the area prior to being told by ICCN, WCS and the Bantu chiefs that they should stop hunting, gathering natural resources and/or entering the area demarcated as protected areas. When asked why they accepted this instruction, they referred to the long and painful history of oppression and that non-compliance is not an option due to the presen**ce** of the biomonitoring team that are said to often confiscate the bushmeat and NTFPs and/or the people they find in the core zone to the village council. Faced with these threats, they, according to them, significantly reduced their hunting and gathering and try to focus on agriculture. Their challenge is that besides of Logogo 2 hardly any vacant arable land is said to be available to establish their own farms and/or that they have insufficient resources to rent land from the chiefs and/or prepare it for agriculture. While in Logogo 2, the participants indicated that around 40% of the Batwa households have their own farms, which are said to be very small and hardly able to sustain their subsistence, the participants in the two other Batwa settlements indicated that hardly any Batwa family has its own farm. The Batwa from all three settlements indicated that their main source of income and livelihood is to work as day-labourers on the farms of the Bantu and that in Barwani they receive USD 0.25 to 0.5/day and in the two other settlements between USD 0.5 and 1 which allows them barely to survive and which is insufficient to pay school fees for their children and that consequently hardly any Batwa children are able to attend even primary school.

The PIR 2025 indicated that limited progress has been made on outcome 3 besides indicator 12, which anyway seems more related to outcome 2. One of the reasons given is that action 3.1.1 (participatory mapping of the community territory), 3.1.2 (development of community development plans and action), 3.1.3 (community development and training) depend on the finalisation of the ESIA/ESMP and the underlying safeguard documents and consequently has not started yet (activity report Q1/2025). The project team was also of the view that the identification of sustainable livelihood options (activity 3.2) and the development of a green micro-entrepreneurship approach piloted for conservation-friendly businesses (activity 3.3.) depend on the local development plan (action 3.1) and the socio-economic studies conducted by ICCN in the context of the elaboration of the landscape management plans.

At the time of the MTR in January 2026 the following drafts reports were made available:

- **The Socio-economic baseline study for the Kabobo Luama Landscape (September 2024)** uses the Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) methodology, which was developed in the 1980s and consists of a set of guidelines which help projects to work in a structured but flexible way in rural communities and offers tools to aid communication and interaction with

those communities. The findings are based on nine focus group discussion with ten to twelve people. While a very established tool, the MTR Team notes that social science considers RRA not as an adequate instrument to establish socio-economic baseline data, and a sample of around 100 people through 9 focus group interviews certainly insufficient to provide a representative assessment of the people in the 120 villages. While providing some preliminary information, the study therefore cannot be considered a satisfactory deliverable on the gender-sensitive database on socio-economic characteristics called for in the ProDoc (page 154) and/or the Basic Necessities Survey called for in indicator 13. The 2009 "socio-economic survey around the Misotshi-Kabobo forest in southeastern DRC" conducted by WCS, which interviewed 413 households from 38 villages, while providing useful information, cannot substitute the baseline data and BNS study called for in the ProDoc as the data are outdated and the coverage rather limited.

- **The Feasibility study for the implementation of green micro-projects that respect the conservation of the Kabobo Luama landscape (September 2024) and the selection of green micro-projects that respect the environment (December 2024)** provide some information on existing micro-projects and summarises some engagement with stakeholders on their preferences and interests. Both studies do however not provide any economic evaluation of the assessed micro-projects, and/or establish operational budget and business plans for each identified pilot project and can therefore not be considered as satisfactory delivery on output 3.3.

In sum, the MTR Team concludes that it is hardly unlikely that any process had been made on indicator 13 and 14 as the underlying studies have either not started or do not deliver the required information and it is therefore only consequent that not a single livelihood restoration and enhancement activity has started. Based on the evidence, it seems more likely that the socio-economic situation has deteriorated and the local population in the 120 settlements in the landscape further impoverished. The situation of the Batwa is even more dramatic as all information suggests that they have lost their main source of livelihoods (hunting and gathering) without being provided with any livelihood restoration and/or alternative livelihoods while this was envisaged as one of the three key activities of the project. As the project did not establish credible baseline data, while being tasked to do so under the ProDoc, the implementation of component 3 is considered highly unsatisfactory with no tangible chance to achieve the expected outcomes. From that perspective it is unclear why the UNDP CO considered in its draft PIR 2025 the progress towards outcome 3 "on track".

4.2.1.5. Outcome 4: Mainstreaming of gender and indigenous peoples' concerns, and lessons learned through participatory project implementation and M&E are used to guide adaptive management, knowledge management and communication in support of upscaling.

Monitoring	Indicators	Targets (MTR Mid-term/ TE Terminal Evaluation)
Project Outcome 4: Mainstreaming of gender and indigenous peoples' concerns, and lessons learned through participatory project implementation and M&E are used to guide adaptive management, knowledge management and communication in support of upscaling.	Indicator 15: Number of good practices on sustainable land-use, biodiversity conservation and stakeholder engagement demonstrated, documented and upscaled for replication	MTR: 3 good practices demonstrated & documented TE: 5 good practices demonstrated, documented and with plans for replication
	Indicator 16: Indicator % of GAP targets met	MTR: 40%; TE: 80%
	Indicator 17: % of ESMP targets met	MTR: 100%; TE: 100%
	Indicator 18: Influence on governance by different stakeholders, specifically indigenous people and women, measured using the Natural Resources Government Tool	MTR: Tentatively 10% increase TE: Tentatively 25% increase
	Indicator 19: Inclusion of Batwa IP as direct beneficiaries in activities, consultation and recruitment, measured by IP share (%) amongst: participants in local-level trainings; ICCN-hired PA rangers; local consultation committees; exchange visit participants.	MTR: 25% share TE: 25% share

The ProDoc tasked the project under output 4.1. to "conduct a full ESIA during the first 6 months of implementation and … implemented and monitored (the resulting ESMP) accordingly. In addition, the project will prepare and implement a GRM. The ESMP will be supported by targeted management plans including RAP, LAP, IPP, MMP, as required. Each plan will include indicators to monitor its implementation. In addition to the requirements

outlined in the ESMF, all project activities should be implemented in line with the SEP as well as the GAP. As per UNDP transparency and accountability standards, safeguards related information as well as stakeholder engagement and FPIC protocols and documentation should be publicly disclosed (in both English and French)."

While the project formally started in May 2022 with first disbursements in May 2023, WCS only issued the ToR for these studies in November 2023; thus, with a delay of more than one year. The MTR Team notes that the ToR for these studies allows room for improvement that apparently has not been picked up by UNDP's CO. These include but is not limited to the following:

- There are two versions of the **ToR for the ESIA/ESMP** shared with the team. The one issued by the Agence Congolaise de l'environnement entails hardly any references to UNDP's SES, focuses on the construction of infrastructure and considers the integration of the local population in the sustainable forest management as the main social issue of the project while the SESP, which is binding for the parties, had identified 10 social risks and includes high risk issues such as economic displacement and further marginalization of the indigenous Batwa. It is unclear which of the two versions was finally used as basis for the contract with the consultant and which document was cleared by UNDP's CO.
- The **ToR for the LAP/RAP** does not entail references to the relevant UNDP SES and tasks the consultant focuses on general livelihood enhancement and benefit sharing rather than assessing the impacts of physical and economic displacements caused or needed for the enhancement of protection measures envisaged under the project. It does not clarify that the LAP/RAP needs to be established in close collaboration with all affected people to ensure that their livelihoods and living standards are enhanced or at least restored to the pre-project situation.
- The **TOR for the IPP** does not clarify that the FPIC protocol needs to meet the requirements outlined in UNDP SES 5 and/or how this should be documented. In turn, it tasks the consultant to identify a "leader" among the Batwa that could serve as focal point for further engagements, i.e., echoing WCS approach to stakeholder engagement with the Bantu population to an ethnocultural group that is known to have no leaders. It seems therefore no surprise that the ToR require a background and experience in ecology, natural science, and environment rather than a track record of working with indigenous peoples and/or establishing IPPs for international organizations with policies similar to UNDP.
- There seems to be no ToR and/or for the GRM, the project was tasked to establish/enhance.

All ToR clarify that the work of the consultants is closely supervised by the WCS Project Manager and coordinated by the ESIA/ESMP consultant. This work resulted in the following reports:

- **ESIA/ESMP (Draft November 2024):** The ESIA covers solely the construction of posts for the ICCN eco-guards and not the activities to be put in place by the project and is therefore not fit for purpose and not aligned with UNDP's SES. While the project area is large and covers 120 villages, "the Consultant organized four focus groups and two workshops (launch and restitution) in Kalemie." From that perspective, the ESMP budget of USD 408,000 plus the USD 243,650 foreseen in the associated **Health and Safety Plan (Final July 2024)**, appears non-substantiated. The ESIA/ESMP also does not incorporate the findings of the following reports and/or is aligned with them. In sum, the document is not acceptable as is.
- **LRP and RAP (Draft July 2024):** The report states "the Kabobo-Luama Landscape Livelihoods Plan aims to integrate biodiversity considerations into all local development strategies, while adopting a human rights-based approach. It seeks to strengthen institutional capacities, promote co-management of protected areas, and foster sustainable livelihoods for local communities," which seems to suggest that the consultant did not find time to read the ToR that requested a report that assesses and addresses physical and economic displacement impacts caused by the project. From that perspective the USD 2m requested to implement a number of activities including but not limited to USD 325,000 for the development of eco-tourism is not necessarily related to the objectives of UNDP's SES 5 and the document consequently not a satisfactory response to the ToR and/or the documents called for in the ProDoc.

- **IPP (Version Final August 2024):** While the study identified 46 Batwa settlements, the IPP was developed through "two workshops in Kalemie, which brought together more than 60 participants from ministries and sectoral services, NGOs , donors, PAP organizations and others, fourteen interviews (with village chiefs, PAP leaders, leaders of PAP organizations, political-military actors), and 13 focus groups, direct observation, and documentary review." This seems to suggest that not even all forty-six settlements were visited to assess the baseline situation and include the Batwa in the elaboration of the IPP. It seems unlikely that all Batwa were provided with the draft IPP in a manner consistent with the requirements outlined in UNDP's SES 6 to secure their Free Prior and Informed Consent. While some of the proposed actions seem in line with what the MTR Team heard from the Batwa that participated in meetings, others appear surprising. For example, the request to provide a "business fund" of USD 200 to 690 Batwa women to foster income generating activities without any training etc. It also remains unclear why nine of the forty-six settlements should be provided with access to potable water and the others not, or why three primary and secondary schools should be constructed without earmarked any operational funds to pay for teachers, when the main problem seems to be that Batwa households have insufficient income to pay the school fees for their children. While the resulting budget of USD 854,500 is tangible, the proposed activities and implementation approach remain generic. Due to these key shortcomings, the MTR Team finds the IPP not satisfactory for compliance with UNDP's SES 6.
- **GRM:** The available reports refer to the reinforcement of an existing GRM (ICCN & WCS training for the GRM staff conducted in Q2/2024), while the ProDoc asked for a GRM aligned with UNDP`s SES. We were not provided with any description of the existing GRM and/or any strategy document on how it should be enhanced to be aligned with UNDP's SES. From our engagements, it seems that most grievances cannot be solved at village level and that there is no credible process of how ICCN and WCS plan to handle and respond to these grievances. This seems to suggest that to date there is not even a document that outlines what the GRM called for in the ProDoc should look like.
- **MMP (Draft August 2024).** This plan, which foresees the a) establishment of patrol posts in the landscape and strengthening of the ICCN's operational capacities, b) enforcement of the Nature Conservation Act; and disarmament of migrants and other armed groups, c) promotion of family livestock farming; and access to basic socio-economic infrastructure and d) access control system for multiple-use areas in place and operational, and migration management integrated into village administration, seems off-target to manage the migration of people "from South Kivu Province and neighboring countries such as Burundi and Tanzania" that the RP called for in the associated ToRs.
- **BMP (Updated Version December 2024):** While this report is much better, it is unclear how it relates to the overall project, as if USD 379,000 are sufficient to a) stabilize and restore Kabobo-Luama's critical ecosystems, b) protect threatened species, including endemic species of the Albertine Rift. c) improve livelihoods for local communities while enhancing their participation in conservation efforts and d) promote a sustainable and balanced approach to biodiversity conservation and human development, one might want to ask why does the ProDoc allocates USD 12.5m for the same task? The relevance of this study remains unclear as the SESP does not refer to and/or request a BMP, though it is mentioned in the ProDoc.

As the ToR clarified that these studies should be closely supervised by WCS, one is wondering why WCS accepted these studies and made final payments to the consultant. While the MTR team understands that the WCS Project Manager at that time is an expert for biomonitoring with limited exposure to social and environmental safeguards, one would assume that the local team sends these documents to the experts within WCS for review and comments and/or secures outside support if there is nobody in WCS who can supervise these studies and speaks French. When asked about the reason these documents were approved and the consultants released, WCS told the MTR team that the consultants, while formally hired by WCS, were preselected and recommended by UNDP's CO and WCS put under pressure by UNDP's CO to accept these substandard documents against their will. These allegations are

refuted by UNDP's CO. As no documentation whatsoever was provided, the MTR team notes that WCS had hired these consultants and therefore had full leverage over their work and would need to provide evidence for their claim that UNDP's CO instructed them to accept these documents. In turn, there is no documentation that suggests that UNDP's CO in their role as organization in charge of quality and compliance assurance with UNDP's SES has provided clear guidance to WCS on how to enhance the documents while the consultants were still under contract and/or how to bring the project back into compliance.

The non-compliance was finally identified by UNDP's SES TA, with a corrective action plan drafted in November 2024. It remains however unclear why UNDP did not use its option to formally suspend disbursement until the safeguard package was enhanced by WCS and its consultant as well as why UNDP's CO had at that time already disbursed USD 1.5m while the ProDoc clarified that no activities should be implemented before the safeguard package is in place.

For the MTR Team, the most concerning element is that to date (more than a year later) no progress has been made to align the safeguard package with UNDP's requirements. The main reason seems to be that WCS, including parts of its regional safeguard team, maintains that the reports are of sufficient quality and that they know better what UNDP's SES requires than UNDP's SES TA. This is surprising as the contract between UNDP and WCS is, besides some participatory language such as "responsible party", clear on who is in charge of interpreting and ensuring compliance with UNDP's SES.

With a view on the indicator 15, the MTR Team would find it inappropriate to talk about "good practices on sustainable land-use, biodiversity conservation and stakeholder engagement" under this project as long as it has not solved the underlying issues such as the safeguard package and/or a strategy on how to enhance local livelihoods to outcompete the drivers of biodiversity loss.

Regarding indicator 16, i.e. the question of what percentage of the targets of the GAP has been met, the MTR Team observed some progress in the share of women that participated in awareness-raising on the need for conservation, trainings, and the operationalization of the GRM, but these do not amount to more than one or two targets met, which suggests that at max 10% of the targets have been met after nearly four years of operation while the MTR review target was 40% after 2 years. The MTR team could also not identify how, where and when the USD 40,000 allocated for the GAP were disbursed and/or who oversees GAP implementation within the RP.

As the underlying ESMP is not acceptable, it seems inappropriate to measure the progress of its implementation as foreseen under indicator 17.

Indicators 18 and 19 try to measure the participation in decision making and the benefits received by the Batwa. As to date no livelihood activities have been implemented.The Batwa, besides a small number that benefits from being employed by WCS, did not benefit from the project yet andwere further impoverished. With a view on their participation in decision making processes, WCS continues to conduct all engagements and decision-making through the government-appointed Bantu chiefs which perpetuates the marginalization of the Batwa even if some very few are from time to time invited to participate in meetings and get some food and transport allowance. As the IPP has not been finalized and/or established in close consultations with the Batwa, there is no credible procedure available and/or implemented to ensure that the former hunter-gatherers are involved in all decision-making that affects them in a way that they can provide their free, prior and informed consent or not. Based on this finding, one cannot speak of any progress made against indicator 18 and 19.

In sum, the MTR Team concludes that performance on outcome 4 is highly unsatisfactory. The most worrying elements are that WCS was in its Q1/2025 progress report of the view that within two weeks one could "fill the gaps in the project risk assessment so that all planned activities could proceed without further delay, including all necessary mitigation measures" and UNDP's CO assumes that progress against output 4 was "on track", the IPP elaborated and

already under implementation (PIR 2025), as without an mutual acknowledgment of the magnitude of gaps in the safeguard framework there is limited chance for enhancement.

4.3. Remaining barriers to achieving the project objective

One of the main challenge of the project is that no progress has been made on the generation of sustainable livelihoods to outcompete the economic drivers of the bushmeat trade and biodiversity loss, as without progress on this side, it seems just a question of time until the local population considers the natural resources merely as an income opportunity and starts to clear the landscape to make space for mines and plantations. Another challenge is that limited progress has been made in the elaboration of participatory management plans for the landscape and the three protected areas located in it. The third challenge is the non-compliance of the safeguard package with UNDP's SES as this blocks the disbursement of existing funds and the mobilization of new funds. In sum, the MTR Team finds that none of the barriers identified in the ProDoc had been tackled successfully and that therefore the barriers outlined in the ProDoc remain in place. As these barriers will not change over time, the project needs to revisit its strategy on how to address them in a coordinated and aligned approach that does not harm people.

Before embarking on an adapted strategy, the safeguard documents need to be enhanced to bring the project back into compliance with UNDP's SES. Besides that, the project will need to revisit the boundaries to ensure that sufficient land is available for all households in the 120 villages for agricultural and livestock rearing as presently local livelihoods seem insufficient to provide significant numbers of people with tangible incomes that reduce their interest in hunting and gathering of natural resources. The project further needs to find an effective and efficient way to address the human wildlife conflict. As fencing all agricultural areas in the 120 villages is unfeasible with the residual budget (around USD 2m), the project will need to assess whether a compensation scheme for crop damage caused by wildlife, as envisaged in draft legislation and implemented in most neighboring countries, is feasible and what costs this entails if fairly and adequately operated by a further updated GRM. In this context the IPP and MMP need to outline tangible ways on how the livelihoods of the Batwa and the herders can be integrated into the system to overcome historic marginalization and oppression. An intermediate and/or low hanging alternative would be to allow hunting with traps in agricultural areas, which is a proven instrument to harmonize protected area management with local livelihoods. The project will also need to find ways of how to cooperate with the mining concessions and artisanal miners as, even with the large budgets requested by ICCN's local teams, experience shows that the envisaged number of eco-guards will not be able to reduce the adverse environmental impacts of mining against the will of those involved; thus the project needs to extends its participatory approach to another driver of biodiversity loss to be successful. While the MTR Team considers this as a feasible option, it will require openness from all sides.

4.4. Project Implementation and Adaptive Management

The **management arrangement**, as outlined in the ProDoc, responded to the concerns of the donor community that resulted in the termination of ICCN's longstanding DG Cosma Wilungula based on corruption charges. While in the past, funds were routed through ICCN, the project's operational funds for the landscape are largely disbursed from UNDP to WCS and then from WCS to ICCN. One downside of this approach is that ICCN's local teams became WCS service providers of WCS rather than the other way around. Another downside is that due to an outdated concession agreement between ICCN and the Foundation Cosma of the former ICCN DG WCS has less interest in providing funds and services to the Ngandja reserve and/or the Luama area that has not yet been transferred to ICCN. While these challenges were known at the time of the kick-off meeting of the project in May 2022, the Project Board seems to have not tried to adjust the management arrangement to equally cover the entire landscape.

The Project Boad seems also not have considered adjusting the project strategy when ICCN indicated it was deploying 30 eco-guards to the Ngandja reserve and consequently prioritize the establishment of a safeguard framework for these activities in line with UNDP's SES and conduct the reassessment of boundaries and zones through participatory land use maps, livelihood

enhancement activities and the elaboration of a participatory management plan for the Ngandja reserve to align the activities of the ICCN eco-guards with the approach outlined in the ProDoc.

The existing management arrangement did not find adequate steps to accelerate implementation after limited progress had been made between May 2022 and November 2024 and further process hindered by the non-satisfactory safeguard. While WCS brought in a new project manager, UNDP and/or ICCN maintained their structure while the Project Board seems to have vanished. From that perspective, it seems advisable to revisit the management arrangement and align the required competencies with the roles and responsibilities and/or enhance capacities to enable the people in charge to deliver their job descriptions.

The **work planning** to date limits the role of UNDP's CO to the review and endorsement of budget requests from WCS, while ICCN and WCS have bi-weekly meetings in Kalemie to discuss next steps etc. The establishment of a PMU to manage the project on a day-by-day basis under the supervision of the Project Board is generally fine, but to have the PMU in Kinshasa while the team is in Kalemie and Fizi didn't work out well as it detached UNDP's CO from the day to day activities. The only supervision mission deployed by the CO in July 2024 provided twenty-two recommendations, but there seems to have been limited follow-up as many of these action-items remaining still remain open1.5 years later. The project will need to enhance its cooperation and coordination by establishing a mutual understanding of the work to be conducted as it seems, for example unclear why WCS has deployed 22 people to conduct biomonitoring before the actual project implementation has started. One can equally ask why the livelihood work is conducted by two people while the ProDoc has allocated a higher budget to component 3 than for component 2. There is also no work-breakdown structure that shows which activity depends on the outcome of which other activity and consequently results in a living schedule that can be managed with available software solutions like MS Project etc.

Finance and co-finance of the project follows UNDP's FACE management under which the RP is responsible for procurement and only needs to provide copies of supporting documentation when specifically requested by UNDP in situations where a greater degree of oversight is deemed necessary. The MTR Mission noted that the project reduced the FACE system further to one line item per component, which allocated for example in June 2024 USD 43,444 for component 2 and USD 21,304 for component 3 without much additional details. The more detailed ICE form, which should track actual expenditures, shows however that the allocated amounts were then reallocated and that for example the PM, which had no budget line in FACE under component 2, received during this period USD 14,342.57. While WCS kindly shared a copy of a UNDP-commissioned audit for WCS's 2023 expenditures, the audit which was conducted in July 2025 suggests that by the end of December 2024 (sic!) USD 215,605.63 have been audited without providing details on the expenditures in 2023. There is even less clarity on the budget allocated to ICCN. In sum, the MTR Team finds that the project's expenditures are not properly accounted for following the budget codes provided in the ProDoc, and that the audit does not sufficiently analyze WCS expenditures while there is no audit of ICCN expenditures and therefore recommends conducting a full audit of expenditures to date.

The **Project-level monitoring and evaluation systems** allow room for improvement as they do not follow the monitoring framework outlined in the ProDoc. The quarterly reports limit themselves to activity monitoring at a rather generic level and for example do ,,not clarify whether the objectives of an activity have been met and what needs to be achieved before other activities can start, which seems the logical consequence if work is not properly planned (see above). While clearly tasked to establish baselines and monitor progress against the indicators of the results framework, UNDP's PIRs rather guesstimated progress and, for example, interpret the participation in a sensitization on the importance of biodiversity into being a project beneficiary in contrast to the definition and calculation method outlined in the ProDoc. While such situations are not unknown in the first months of project implementation, UNDP's CO, which has been tasked by the ProDoc to ensure the quality of delivery and align the project with UNDP and GEF processes, seem to not have flagged the absence of baseline data and their supervision mission

report for July 2024 does not indicate that they used this mission to enhance the capacity of WCS on monitoring and evaluation and consequently reporting.

The project's main approach to **stakeholder engagement** is to use the CLG and its subsidiaries CCC and CLC as representatives of the population in the 120 villages including the 46 settlements of the Batwa. This structure was established top-down by WCS between 2008 and 2016 by bringing together the chiefs from various levels. As these chiefs are installed by the government for life, there is no need for elections and/or rules and regulations. To motivate their work, the chiefs are provided with transport allowances etc. to hold meetings, sensitize their subjects, and enforce laws etc. The MTR Team has not been provided with details of the present payment scheme and/or rules and regulations but has received a request from CLG to professionalize their work through monthly payments rather than the present approach of working at the full discretion of WCS. The fifteen members of the CLG, which includes the six *chefs des groupement*s, propose that the project should pay them between USD 400 and 500/month for their services and provide them with USD 32,000/year as operational budget for their office. The fifteen members of the CCC should receive monthly salaries between USD 300 and USD 350 and the 120 members of the CLC with monthly salaries between USD 200 and 250. In sum, the structure of local representatives created by WCS considers that they provide the project with services with a total estimated value of USD 460,800/year.

In sum, the existing system of stakeholder engagement will need to be aligned with UNDP's SES to ensure the informed participation of the indigenous Batwa as the present system is in non-compliance with UNDP's SES 6. One of the key challenges is that those in charge of safeguards in WCS are of the view that this system of engagement and the signing of written agreements in French by CLC etc. documents the meaningful participation of the Bantu population and the FPIC of the Batwa. However, as the MTR Team knows that WCS leadership has aligned itself with modern concepts of conservation, the challenge seems to be more at the intermediate level and can therefore be solved without much delay through an engagement with WCS HQ and leadership.

The key challenge of the project to ensure compliance with **UNDP's and GEF's Social and Environmental Standards (Safeguards)** seems to be rooted in a limited capability of UNDP's CO to ensure and control compliance. The challenge is not new and is a common issue in large multinational organizations that tend to pendle between centralized and decentralized organizational settings. In the present setting, decisions within UNDP are made within the CO with the centralized structures in an advisory function. While these entails many benefits for an organization such as UNDP, it entails also significant challenges with regards to safeguard compliance as it would be unreasonable to assume that each SES focal points in the CO and/or UNDP staff in charge of safeguard compliance assurance within projects is sufficiently qualified and competent to deliver on this task without a robust backstopping and oversight system. The adequate function of UNDP's system is further challenged by the fact that most safeguard staff in the CO are national staff with limited experience and incentives to challenge state actors and powerful organizations such as WCS on their interpretation and implementation of UNDP's SES. Due to the limited technical oversight, organizations experience also a significant level of corruption under which the leverage and reach of safeguard staff is used to skim parts of the payments made to consultants selected and supervised by them. As CO leadership cannot identify and/or validate quality concerns, this system has resulted in increased costs for mediocre services and consultants cutting corners specifically on stakeholder engagement to pay those that approve their services.

While ICCN is deeply knowledgeable about environmental issues and attracts dedicated staff, the organization still needs time to align itself with the participatory approach to conservation. Due to its own limited funds, ICCN remains dependent on capacity enhancement provided by partners. The ProDoc considered that and tasked WCS to support ICCN in the establishment and implementation of a safeguard framework.

WCS, as an organization, has adequate policies and procedures that are aligned with UNDP's SES etc. It is therefore unclear why the team deployed by WCS were not able to achieve the most basic elements of the safeguard framework such as that an ESIA/ESMP needs to cover all activities of a project and not just the construction of ranger posts, to notice that the consultant in charge of RAP/LRP didn't understand the concept of economic displacement, and that some focus group discussion are insufficient to obtain the FPIC of the Batwa in 46 settlements on the IPP. While UNDP's CO is in charge of identifying these and other shortcomings in their review and commenting, which the MTR Team was not able to review, discussions with the UNDP CO staff suggests that they themselves have a limited understanding and therefore can only provide limited support, oversight and quality assurance for the work performed by WCS. However, it is unclear why a reputable organization like WCS was not able to detect these issues through their own quality assurance and more importantly not able to enhance the quality of the safeguard documents over the last 15 months since UNDP informed them the documents in its present form are not acceptable and the project therefore is on hold until these issues are fixed.

It is no surprise that without adequate work planning, detailed budgets etc. the **reporting** provided by WCS and UNDP's CO is substandard. Due to the absence of clearly defined objectives of activities and a work breakdown structure that allows to report and monitor progress against the results framework, the reports are mostly anecdotal and WCS reports largely focused on biomonitoring without clarifying what value their lengthy tables and graphs have for the overall project. From the perspective of the ProDoc, biomonitoring is intended to measure progress against the objectives of wildlife and biodiversity conservation. As the safeguard system has not been finalized, the participatory management of the landscape and the protected area did not start, the eco-guards in Kabobo are not deployed and not a single livelihood restoration and improvement method is implemented, the value of biomonitoring is questionable.

However, the MTR team would like to underscore that the root cause is not the insufficient reporting but the absence on a participatory and detailed planning process with a work breakdown structure and associated schedules, clear descriptions of tasks and objectives of activities and monitoring and evaluation of whether these have been met. Without this basis, quarterly reports and PIRs must remain anecdotal reports with limited relevance for the overall management of the project. The project will therefore need to start by enhancing its planning processes to ultimately enable proper reporting.

With a view on **communications & knowledge management**, the MTR Team notes that this process seems driven by WCS that disseminates information, holds press conferences, and publishes reports with limited alignment with UNDP and ICCN. While this might be in the nature of an organization that needs to sell its services to the public and donors, under normal procedures such publications would need to be aligned with the overall project concept and therefore agreed with all other partners as for example it seems rather unclear of whether ICCN Headquarters is fully aligned with the request from WCS to terminate a mining concession that apparently was obtained through a regular process before the protection status of Kabobo was increased.

4.5. Sustainability

The **financial risks to sustainability** are significant as to date as USD 1.5m has been spent without any tangible evidence of progress against the results framework. The key challenge is that the residual funds, including the counterpart funds that have not yet been mobilized, seem insufficient to get the project to a point where the projects support to social development and livelihood restoration/improvement is able to provide the local people with tangible incentive to not start again with hunting and unsustainable forest and resource use. They presently have reduced/stopped these activities in anticipation of future developments, but all engagements suggest that their patience is running out, and one cannot necessarily blame them for that after they have waited for more than ten years. The MTR Team therefore suggests that the residual funds are used to establish some lighthouse projects that demonstrate the value of the project

concept and prepare another project that upscale these with a sizable budget. However, one needs to acknowledge that the funds used to date are lost and have not resulted in any financial sustainability and that due to the poor performance of the project the chances to establish a situation in which the project generates its own operation costs let alone a recovery of the investment have significantly reduced and that no one can guarantee that spending more funds on this project enhances the chances that it achieves financial sustainability.

The project has not yet documented that it can deliver **socio-economic sustainability** and has to date has perpetuated the impoverishment of the Bantu in the 120 villages and increased the impoverishment and marginalization of the Batwa in 46 settlements. While the project seems capable of aligning environmental and socio-economic development through the participatory management of the landscape, this has hardly started, not tested any alternative livelihoods or support to green enterprises and thus not provided any tangible evidence that it will ever achieve the objective of socio-economic sustainability. The MTR team is of the view that without radical readjustments that focus on promoting and financing environmental sustainable livelihoods, the project will not be able to achieve socio-economic sustainability and will result in a situation where the local population capitalizes on their access to the natural resources in the landscape for their socio-economic development without looking at environmental impacts of these activities, and that this is largely driven by the fact that the project failed to deliver tangible progress on its livelihood restoration and improvement objectives within the agreed timeframe.

The **institutional framework and governance risks to sustainability** of the project are significant as the partners have not found the strength to align themselves and bring the safeguard documents up to speed in order to implement other activities in a framework that does not hurt people specifically already marginalized and vulnerable groups such as the Batwa. If WCS does not overcome its resistance to the finding that its present practice is not aligned with participatory natural resource management as outlined in UNDP's SES, their reputation will further suffer after being found and/or suspected of violating human rights in their operations in Kahuzi Biega, and the Republic of Congo. For UNDP, the risk is that GEF perceives this as another project where UNDP could not ensure compliance with its own SES, which was largely developed to maintain UNDP's access to GEF funds under the common framework agreement. The risk for ICCN is that they are perceived of not being able to manage its protected areas alone and/or control its partners and therefore faces a reduced ability to seek funds for its own operations and manage protected areas on their own rather than as service providers for organizations like WCS, WWF and African Parks. It seems therefore essential that the three partners team up to address the issues rather than blame each other and/or argue about the merits of UNDP's decision that the safeguard package in its present form is not acceptable.

The **environmental risks to sustainability** are intricately linked to the success of the project. While some might argue that environmental sustainability can also be achieved by deploying more eco-guards and evicting the remaining people from the core protection area and buffer zones etc., experience from other countries shows that this approach is not sustainable and will result eventually in the loss of wildlife and biodiversity. To protect the core areas and buffer zones of this huge landscape from the people living in the 120 villages, mining companies, migrants from other parts of the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi would require the deployment of more than a thousand eco-guards which is unfeasible with the allocated funds, financially unsustainable, and socio-economically unsustainable as this would result in an even further impoverishment of the local people that at some stage will trigger their resistance.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1. Conclusions

1. The MTR found **major gaps and dysfunction in UNDP's CO oversight**. While the CO identified during a July 2024 supervision mission that "the local communities were not involved in setting the boundaries of the (Ngandja) reserve and are not involved in its management"; i.e. identifying a clear non-compliance with the approach outlined in the ProDoc, this finding did not trigger any corrective actions and/or change in the risk rating.
2. **UNDP's CO appears to struggle with weak governance and exhibits limited capability in project oversight and SES risk management** (i.e. safeguard oversight). The ESIA-ESMP process (incl. GRM, RAP, LAP, IPP, MMP, BAP, HSP and updated SEP and GAP) instigated by the CO and RP in 2024 did not meet UNDP SES requirements and has not led to any improvements in project safeguard practices. The underlying issue seems to be that the CO accepted the documents before obtaining technical advisory inputs from UNDP's RTA and SES TA and was then unable to put in place measures together with the RP to enhance the package to meet minimum requirements. While the ProDoc clarifies that no activities that entail potential adverse impacts can commence before the safeguard package in line with UNDP's SES is implemented, the CO seem to have struggled to communicate this to the RP and stop the biomonitoring that entails destroying snares, reporting people found within the reserves to the local authorities and dispossessing people of bushmeat, NTFPs etc. until the livelihoods restoration plan was finalized and implemented.
3. The **RP contract** is not fit-for-purpose and requires renegotiation as the CO has limited to no control over planning, budget allocation or instruments to verify reported costs. The limited transparency of how expenditures by the IP and the RP relate to budget allocations warrant a full audit of expenditures by the IP and the RP.
4. While the **ProDoc tasked the RP to focus equally on capacity building (USD 0.7m), co-management of protected areas (0.8m) and livelihood enhancement (0.9m), since 4/2023, the RP focuses nearly entirely on biomonitoring** (22 staff) while the participatory landscape and PA management plans are not yet drafted through the participatory process outlined in ProDoc (community land use maps etc.) and not aligned with UNDP SES (associated safeguard measures, specifically for economic displacement and integration of IPs, of insufficient quality). While the ProDoc provided the largest budget for livelihood enhancement and social infrastructure, the RP allocated two staff to this task and has to date not completed the underlying basic need study and local development plan and not implemented any action besides of community sensitizations to stop hunting. The RP was planning to finance the livelihood activities through a USAID Project, but this did not materialize and this cross-financing was also not formally agreed with the CO.
5. **For stakeholder engagement and ensuring/documenting FPIC, the RP uses written agreements in French with the local authorities (chefs) installed by the government that often do not live in the involved 120 villages in an area where the literacy rate is below 10% and hardly anybody in the villages speak French**. This is not in line with the requirements of UNDP's SES. It is worrying that the RP's regional safeguard staff consider this approach to be in line with UNDP's SES while anthropological studies suggest that this colonial governance model is losing its relevance and the fact that the Batwa are an egalitarian society without rulers etc. and have not agreed to be subjects of the Bantu chiefs.
6. While in 2012/3 the local population seems to have been willing to not use the core area of the reserve in exchange for local development (roads, schools, potable water, health centers, livelihood support, and compensation for wildlife damages to their crops etc.), **local support for sustainable development seems to have significantly reduced as the promised social development and livelihood support has not materialized**. The substantial number of indigenous Batwa that were forced to give up hunting and gathering were not provided, as foreseen in the ProDoc, with adequate alternative livelihoods, specifically land and support to start farming and are forces them to work as day laborers at USD 0.25 to 0.5/day.
7. While ICCN has not yet deployed eco-guards in two of the three PA to enforce laws, the RP's bio-monitoring team is said to destroy snares and confiscate forest products also outside the reserve. In the Ngandja reserve, where the RP has not started capacity enhancement, stakeholder engagement, and livelihood development, the IP has deployed

30 eco-guards and included 30 local eco-guards into its team that are funded by the local militia. The project provides limited capacity enhancement to these eco-guards who document in their reportsthat they **burned down a settlement** in the reserve without following proper protocols in line with UNDP's SES. The well-intentioned but misguided IP senior staff funded by the project has an informal arrangement in place with local militias to provide arms, support law enforcement and threatens **to execute gorilla or chimpanzee poachers**.

8. The RP was potentially involved in **physical resettlement** of indigenous Batwa from one or more of the protected areas n anticipation of the landscape conservation programme, of which the project forms a key part. The scale of resettlement warrants further fieldwork. While not conducted under this project, the question is whether the project development's due diligence sufficiently asked why there is not a single settlement even by the Batwa in the two southern reserves and what is the plan for the villages/camps in the northern reserve.
9. While the government allocated a mining concession in the Kabobo reserves and artisanal mining is found in all reserves, the RP did not assess the impacts of the activities in detail and/or establish a strategy on how to contain this by agreeing on mercury-free mining methods etc. The RP's present strategy to call for a complete mining stop seems unrealistic.
10. A **GRM,** which has gradually updated since 6/2025, is not known to most people in the 120 communities and seems to be limited to providing people affected by crop damage from wildlife with an avenue to voice their concerns without any strategy or mechanism on how to respond and/or provide remedies. Significant grievances such as indications that the boundary of the core area of the reserve are in local farms 2 km away from a village seem to not be recorded and there seems to be no willingness from the project to address the issue "as the boundaries have been participatorily established.", while in fact the ProDoc foresees to establish various land use zones based on participatory mapping and in close consultations with all stakeholders include local farmers etc.

5.2. Recommendations

- UNDP issues a 'stop order' on all expenditure by RP and IP until further notice. This is necessary as the RP is presently operating under a reimbursable contract that provides the CO with very limited control on upfront expenditure.
- UNDP commissions a full audit of the expenditures by IP and RP to date to establish a clear basis for the next steps.
- UNDP searches and secures realistic financing arrangements and revisits counterpart funding assumptions.
- UNDP develops a Responsible Exit Plan that aims to use the remaining project funds to
  - To hold the finalization of all protected area management plans until the affected people are able to meaningfully participate in its elaboration and the Batwa invited to provide their FPIC to the engagement method to be outlined in a revised and significantly enhanced IPP:
  - Remediate the social gaps including participatory mapping, livelihood restoration, targeted affirmative actions for Batwa (secured access to farmland), compensation for crop damage resulting from human wildlife conflicts, enhance GRM effectiveness, and
  - lay the foundations for future investments, such as producing and validating an FPIC-compliant landscape management plan, using biomonitoring data, participatory mapping and comprehensive time-bound livelihood restoration and enhancement plans.
- CO and RP to renegotiate contract based on the responsible exit strategy that includes that UNDP SES commitments are built into an Environmental and Social Commitment Plan.
- RP urgently hires a qualified expert to finalize and operationalize the safeguard package, including FPIC and GRM in close consultations with all stakeholders;
- Re-sequencing of activities to prioritize social baseline data, participatory mapping, and livelihood restoration.

- Aligning conservation enforcement with SES-compliant community engagement and benefit-sharing

While the project remains strategically relevant, it is operationally misaligned with its design assumptions and safeguard requirements. The combination of delayed safeguards, weak monitoring systems, limited livelihood implementation, and governance fragmentation has significantly constrained progress across all outcomes. Unless rapid corrective measures are implemented—particularly in safeguards, livelihoods, and institutional coordination, the project is unlikely to achieve its intended integrated conservation and development impacts within the remaining implementation period.



6. Annexes

6.1. Termes de référence pour l'évaluation à mi-parcours du Projet de gestion du paysage de la zone protégée de Kabobo-Luama

Les présents termes de référence (TdR) énoncent les attentes associées à l'évaluation à mi-parcours (MTR) du projet de *grande envergure* intitulé *gestion du paysage de la zone protégée de Kabobo-Luama* et mis en œuvre par *l'institut congolais de la Conservation de la Nature (ICCN) accompagnée par Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS)*. Le projet a démarré le *10 juin 2022* et se trouve actuellement dans sa *3ème* année de mise en œuvre. Le processus de l'évaluation à mi-parcours doit suivre les directives décrites dans le document « Directives pour la conduite de l'examen à mi-parcours des projets appuyés par le PNUD et financés par le FEM »

Contexte et Description du Projet

Le paysage de Kabobo-Luama (667 305 ha) est principalement situé dans la province du Tanganyika, mais la partie nord s'étend dans la province du Sud-Kivu, à l'Est de la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC).

Le paysage fournit des services écosystémiques vitaux d'approvisionnement, de régulation, de soutien et de culture, notamment les ressources forestières, les protéines, la régulation du microclimat, la rétention des sols et de l'eau douce, ce qui profite aux communautés locales, y compris les populations autochtones (Batwa), ainsi qu'à la population de Kalemie, la capitale provinciale.

L'infrastructure socio-économique a été en grande partie détruite par la guerre ou n'est plus fonctionnelle après des années de négligence. Les menaces qui pèsent sur le paysage sont la chasse et la pêche non réglementées, l'exploitation minière artisanale, l'exploitation forestière, la déforestation pour l'agriculture et le pastoralisme.

Les principaux obstacles à la protection de la biodiversité du paysage de Kabobo-Luama sont les suivants :
1) Capacité institutionnelle insuffisante pour la gestion des zones protégées du paysage ;
2) Gestion des zones protégées et application insuffisante de la loi pour garantir la conservation de la biodiversité avec une participation limitée, voire inexistante, des membres des communautés locales ;
3) Faibles niveaux de développement socio-économique, de subsistance et possibilités limitées de génération de revenus ; et
4) Gestion des connaissances et intégration de la dimension genre insuffisantes.

Vers 2016, les communautés bantoues et batwa ont donné leur accord à la création de nouvelles zones protégées dans le paysage de Kabobo Luama, par suite de plus de dix ans de travail de terrain mené par la Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS). Les communautés ont soutenu la création de cette réserve, notamment en raison des importantes destructions de la faune et de la forêt causées par des personnes extérieures, parmi lesquelles des éleveurs, des exploitants forestiers et des chasseurs commerciaux de viande de brousse, et en raison des promesses de développement. Elles espèrent que les zones protégées apporteront le développement, notamment des écoles, des hôpitaux, des emplois, des toits en tôle et de nombreuses autres améliorations à leurs conditions de vie. La région a également été le théâtre d'importants conflits interethniques vers 2017, en partie liés aux conflits fonciers et à l'accès aux ressources naturelles.

Pour ces raisons, les communautés bantoues et batwa sont disposées à soutenir la création des réserves classées de Kabobo et Ngandja, et à limiter leurs propres activités afin d'assurer la protection de la forêt et de la faune. L'agriculture, la pêche et la chasse seront autorisées dans certaines zones et sous certaines conditions. Cependant, comme c'est souvent le cas dans les programmes de protection des zones protégées, les communautés risquent de ne pas être préparées aux restrictions prévues concernant leurs activités, qui pourraient notamment interdire aux agriculteurs (en particulier les Bantous) la pratique de l'agriculture itinérante et aux chasseurs (en particulier les Batwa) la chasse.

Le projet FEM de Kabobo Luama, qui en est à sa troisième année de mise en œuvre par la WCS et l'Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature (ICCN), a été conçu pour répondre à ces risques grâce à une conception participative des zones protégées, une cogestion communautaire et la mise en place de mesures d'atténuation des impacts sur les moyens de subsistance.

Objectif du projet

Le projet voudrait à travers ses interventions renforcer la gestion participative du paysage de la zone protégée de Kabobo-Luama, améliorer la conservation des espèces menacées afin de soutenir le développement durable local

et apporter des avantages à la biodiversité mondiale. Cet objectif sera atteint grâce à quatre (4) composantes interdépendantes, visant à renforcer les capacités institutionnelles, la gestion de la zone protégée, le développement des moyens de subsistance et la gestion des connaissances.

Structure du projet

Le projet est structuré autour de quatre produits représentant des domaines thématiques du projet à savoir :
Produit 1 : Amélioration de la gestion du paysage de la zone protégée de Kabobo-Luama
Produit 2 : Efficacité accrue de la gestion des réserves de Kabobo, Luama- Katanga et Ngandja, avec une capacité accrue de lutte contre la criminalité liée aux espèces sauvages
Produit 3 : Réduction des menaces liées aux moyens de subsistance pour la biodiversité dans et autour des aires protégées
Produit 4 : L'intégration des préoccupations des femmes et des populations autochtones, et les enseignements tirés de la mise en œuvre et du suivi et évaluation participatifs du projet sont utilisés pour orienter la gestion adaptative, la gestion des connaissances et la communication à l'appui de la transposition à plus grande échelle.

Résultats attendus du projet

- Renforcement des capacités des ministères provinciaux du Tanganyika en matière de gestion du paysage ;
- Mise en place d'une capacité institutionnelle locale pour la mise en œuvre du plan de gestion du paysage ;
- Élaboration d'un plan d'entreprise.
- Suivi de la biodiversité et de l'état et des tendances des habitats ;
- Réserves de Kabobo et de Ngandja classées comme réserves nationales ;
- Plans de gestion des zones protégées élaborés et validés ;
- Mise en place d'infrastructures et d'équipements pour les zones protégées ;
- Renforcement des capacités de patrouille et d'exécution ;
- Amélioration des conditions de l'habitat ;
- Élaboration de plans locaux de développement durable ;
- Identification et amélioration des options de moyens de subsistance durables ;
- Approche de micro-entreprise verte pilotée pour les entreprises respectueuses de la conservation ;
- Les garanties environnementales et sociales sont prises en compte ;
- Suivi, évaluation et apprentissage participatifs des projets ;
- Parties prenantes engagées à tous les niveaux ;
- Diffusion des enseignements et des bonnes pratiques du projet et élaboration de stratégies de transposition à plus grande échelle.

Objectif de l'évaluation

L'évaluation à mi-parcours (MTR) évaluera les progrès accomplis dans la réalisation des objectifs et d'atteinte des résultats du projet, tels que spécifiés dans le document de projet, et évaluera les signes précurseurs de la réussite ou de l'échec du projet, dans le but d'identifier les changements nécessaires à apporter afin de mettre le projet sur la bonne voie pour atteindre les résultats escomptés.

L'évaluation examinera également la stratégie du projet et les risques qui pèsent sur sa viabilité. En particulier, la procédure d'examen des risques environnementaux et sociaux (SESP) du PNUD a identifié un nombre de risques élevés ainsi que des mesures d'atténuation de ces risques en lien avec les normes environnementales et sociales (NES) du PNUD suivantes : droits de l'homme (P1) ; peuples autochtones (S6) ; déplacement et délocalisation (économique) (S5) ; sécurité communautaire (application de la loi par les écogardes) (S3). Malgré le fort engagement de la WCS et de l'ICCN sur le terrain et la réalisation de plusieurs évaluations et plans de sauvegardes en 2024, ce projet classifié Haut Risque n'est pas encore conforme aux NES du PNUD. Il a été constaté que des activités présentant des risques identifiés pourraient se poursuivre ou avoir été déjà poursuivie au nom du projet sans mesures d'atténuation appropriées.

Approche et méthodologie de l'évaluation à mi-parcours

Le rapport de l'évaluation à mi-parcours doit fournir des informations fondées sur des données factuelles crédibles, fiables et utiles. L'équipe chargée de l'évaluation à mi-parcours examinera toutes les sources d'information pertinentes, y compris les documents préparés au cours de la phase de préparation (tels que le FIP, le plan d'initiation du PNUD, le SESP ou procédure d'examen des risques environnementaux et sociaux du PNUD), le document de projet, les rapports de projet, y compris l'examen annuel du projet/les rapports d'exécution, les

révisions budgétaires du projet, les documents stratégiques et juridiques nationaux, les contrats et accords de projet pertinents, les évaluations et plans de sauvegardes du projet, les NES et les exigences du PNUD en matière d'étude d'impact environnementale et sociale, et tout autre document que l'équipe jugera utile pour cet examen fondé sur des données probantes.

L'équipe examinera également les indicateurs de base et les outils de suivi de référence et à mi-parcours des domaines d'intervention du FEM soumis au FEM lors de l'approbation du projet ainsi que les indicateurs de base et les outils de suivi des domaines d'intervention du FEM à mi-parcours qui doivent être achevés avant le début de la mission sur le terrain pour l'évaluation à mi-parcours de ce projet.

Pour ce faire, elle suivra une approche collaborative et participative en s'engageant étroitement avec l'équipe de projet, les homologues gouvernementaux (les points focaux opérationnels du FEM), le partenaire de mise en œuvre (ICCN),), la partie responsable (WCS), le bureau du PNUD RDC, le conseiller technique régional (RTA), le conseiller technique de sauvegarde du PNUD (SES TA), des bénéficiaires directs et d'autres parties prenantes.

L'engagement des parties prenantes est essentiel à la réussite de cette évaluation. La participation des parties prenantes devra inclure des entretiens avec les parties prenantes qui ont des responsabilités dans le projet, y compris, mais sans s'y limiter les agences d'exécution, les hauts fonctionnaires et les chefs d'équipes de travail/de composantes, les parties responsables, les experts et consultants clés dans le domaine concerné, le conseil du projet, les parties prenantes du projet, le monde universitaire, les autorités locales et les OSC, etc. En outre, l'équipe chargée de l'évaluation effectueront des missions sur le terrain à Kabobo (Province du Tanganyika) et Ngandja (Province du Sud-Kivu), y compris sur les sites du projet jugés stratégiques pour garantir le succès de la mission d'évaluation.

Cette évaluation a également un rôle essentiel dans l'évaluation de tout impact environnemental et social négatif et dans la recommandation de mesures correctives, dans le cadre de l'objectif du MTR d'évaluer les risques pour la durabilité du projet. Par conséquent, les personnes consultées du MTR doivent inclure un échantillonnage représentatif des groupes vulnérables/marginalisés, dont notamment les populations autochtones (Batwa)[6], qui ont été identifiés comme récepteurs de risques dans le SESP and dans les annexes de sauvegarde du ProDoc. Toute consultation avec les populations autochtones doit obligatoirement suivre un protocole de Consentement Libre Informé et Préalable (CLIP), ce qui demandera une planification des échanges pour assurer que l'information soit divulguée à l'avance et que le format et le lieu des réunions soient consentis par les participants et ce consentement soit documenté.

La conception et la méthodologie spécifiques de l'évaluation à mi-parcours devront résulter de consultations entre l'équipe d'évaluation et les parties susmentionnées concernant ce qui est approprié et faisable pour atteindre le but et les objectifs de l'évaluation à mi-parcours et répondre aux questions de l'évaluation, compte tenu des limitations de budget, de temps et de données. L'équipe d'évaluation (consultants) devra toutefois utiliser des méthodologies et des outils sensibles au genre et veillera à ce que l'égalité des sexes et l'autonomisation des femmes, ainsi que d'autres questions transversales et les ODD, soient intégrés dans le rapport de l'évaluation à mi-parcours du projet.

L'approche méthodologique finale, y compris le calendrier des entretiens, les visites sur le terrain et les données à utiliser dans l'évaluation à mi-parcours, devra être clairement décrite dans le rapport initial de l'évaluation à mi-parcours et fera l'objet d'une discussion approfondie et d'un accord entre le PNUD, les parties prenantes et l'équipe chargée de l'évaluation du projet à mi-parcours.

Le rapport final de l'évaluation à mi-parcours devra décrire l'ensemble de l'approche d'évaluation adoptée et la justification de cette approche, en explicitant les hypothèses sous-jacentes, les défis, les forces et les faiblesses des méthodes et de l'approche de l'examen.

Champ d'application détaillé de l'évaluation à mi-parcours du projet

L'équipe chargée de l'évaluation à mi-parcours du Projet de Kabobo-Luama évaluera les quatre catégories suivantes de progrès du projet (voir *Guidance For Conducting Midterm Reviews of UNDP-Supported, GEF-Financed Projects* pour plus de détails) :

[6] A noter les mesures d'atténuation spécifiques aux peoples autochtones, dont l'obtention du Consentement Libre Informé et Préalable (CLIP) pour toute intervention en mesure d'avoir un impact sur les droits ou bien-être des peuples autochtones.

Stratégie du projet

Conception du projet :

- Examinez le problème abordé par le projet et les hypothèses sous-jacentes. Examiner l'effet de toute hypothèse incorrecte ou de tout changement de contexte sur la réalisation des résultats du projet tels qu'ils sont décrits dans le document de projet.
- Examinez la pertinence de la stratégie du projet et évaluez si elle constitue la voie la plus efficace pour atteindre les résultats escomptés. Les enseignements tirés d'autres projets pertinents ont-ils été correctement intégrés dans la conception du projet ?
- Examinez la manière dont le projet répond aux priorités du pays. Examinez l'appropriation du projet par le pays. Le concept du projet était-il conforme aux priorités et aux plans de développement du secteur national du pays (ou des pays participants dans le cas de projets régionaux) ?
- Examinez les processus de prise de décision : les perspectives de ceux qui seraient affectés par les décisions relatives au projet, de ceux qui pourraient influer sur les résultats et de ceux qui pourraient apporter des informations ou d'autres ressources au processus ont-elles été prises en compte au cours des processus de conception du projet ?
- Examinez dans quelle mesure les questions pertinentes liées à l'égalité des sexes ont été soulevées lors de la conception du projet.
- Examinez dans quelle mesure les questions de genre pertinentes ont été soulevées dans la conception du projet. Les questions de genre pertinentes (par exemple, l'impact du projet sur l'égalité des sexes en RDC, l'implication des groupes de femmes, l'implication des femmes dans les activités du projet) ont-elles été soulevées dans le document de projet ?
- Examinez dans quelle mesure les principes de programmation PNUD spécifiques sur les droits de l'homme, la durabilité et la résilience, la responsabilité et l'inclusion sociale, et le principe de ne laisser personne de côté ont été soulevées dans la conception du projet. Avec les orientations du SESP du projet et des plans de sauvegarde, l'examen à mi-parcours doit examiner dans quelle mesure la conception du projet a pris en compte ces principes et si des améliorations sont requises.
- S'il y a des sujets de préoccupation majeurs, recommandez des domaines d'action pour la mise en œuvre du projet.

Cadre de résultats/cadre logique :

- Entreprendre une analyse critique des indicateurs et des objectifs du cadre logique du projet, évaluer dans quelle mesure les objectifs à mi-parcours et à la fin du projet sont "SMART" (Spécifiques, Mesurables, Atteignables, Pertinents, Limités dans le Temps), et suggérer des amendements/révisions spécifiques aux objectifs et aux indicateurs si nécessaire.
- Les objectifs et les résultats ou les composantes du projet sont-ils clairs, pratiques et réalisables dans les délais impartis ?
- Examinez si les progrès réalisés jusqu'à présent ont entraîné ou pourraient à l'avenir catalyser des effets bénéfiques sur le développement (c'est-à-dire la génération de revenus, l'égalité des sexes et l'autonomisation des femmes, l'amélioration de la gouvernance etc.…) qui devraient être inclus dans le cadre des résultats du projet et faire l'objet d'un suivi annuel.
- Veillez à ce que les aspects du projet liés au développement et à l'égalité des sexes fassent l'objet d'un suivi efficace. Élaborer et recommander des indicateurs de "développement" SMART, y compris des indicateurs ventilés par sexe et des indicateurs qui tiennent compte des avantages en matière de développement.

Progrès vers les résultats

Analyse de progrès vers les réalisations :

- Examinez les indicateurs du cadre logique par rapport aux progrès réalisés pour atteindre les objectifs de fin de projet ; remplissez la matrice des progrès vers les résultats, comme décrit dans le document *Guidance For Conducting Midterm Reviews of UNDP-Supported, GEF-Financed Projects* ; attribuez un code couleur aux progrès dans un " système de feux tricolores " basé sur le niveau de progrès réalisé ; attribuez une note sur les progrès pour l'objectif du projet et chaque résultat ; faites des recommandations à partir des domaines marqués comme " n'étant pas en voie d'être réalisés " (rouge).

Tableau. Matrice des progrès vers la réalisation des résultats (Réalisations obtenues à la lumière des cibles de fin de projet)

Stratégie de projet	Indicateur[7]	Niveau de référence[8]	Niveau lors du 1er PIR (auto-déclaré)	Cible à mi-parcours[9]	End-of-project Target	Niveau et évaluation à mi-parcours[10]	Notations des réalisatrions[11]	Justification des notations
Objectif:	Indicateur (si applicable):							
Résultat 1:	Indicateur 1:							
	Indicateur 2:							
Résultat 2:	Indicateur 3:							
	Indicateur 4:							
	Etc.							
Etc.								

Grille d'évaluation des indicateurs

Vert = Atteint	Jaune = En bonne voie pour être atteint	Rouge = N'est pas en voie d'être atteint

En plus de l'analyse des progrès réalisés pour atteindre les résultats :

- Comparez et analysez l'outil de suivi du FEM/les indicateurs de base de la base de référence avec celui réalisé juste avant l'examen à mi-parcours.
- Identifier les obstacles restants à la réalisation de l'objectif du projet pour le reste du projet.
- En examinant les aspects du projet qui ont déjà été couronnés de succès, identifiez les moyens par lesquels le projet peut encore accroître ces avantages.

Mise en œuvre du projet et gestion adaptative

Dispositions en matière de gestion :

- Examinez l'efficacité globale de la gestion du projet telle qu'elle est décrite dans le document de projet. Des changements ont-ils été apportés et sont-ils efficaces ? Les responsabilités et les voies hiérarchiques sont-elles claires ? Les décisions sont-elles transparentes et prises en temps voulu ? Recommandez des domaines à améliorer.
- Examinez la qualité de l'exécution de l'agence d'exécution/du/des partenaire(s) chargé(s) de la mise en œuvre et recommandez des domaines d'amélioration. Examinez l'accord de partenariat (contrat) qui gouverne les exigences du PNUD envers la WCS (*Responsible Party*) afin de déterminer s'il articule suffisamment les responsabilités d'assurer la conformité avec les NES du PNUD. Inclure dans cet examen de l'accord de partenariat (contrat) le compris ses exigences en matière d'information financière et d'information sur la mise en œuvre, notant que les arrangements contractuels du ProDoc sont conclus entre le PNUD et le partenaire de mise en œuvre (PI).
- Examinez la qualité de l'appui fourni par l'Entité partenaire du FEM (PNUD) et recommandez des améliorations.
- L'agence d'exécution/le partenaire de mise en œuvre et/ou le PNUD et les autres partenaires ont-ils la capacité d'apporter des avantages aux femmes et de les impliquer ? Si oui, comment ?
- L'agence d'exécution/le partenaire de mise en œuvre et/ou le PNUD et les autres partenaires ont-ils la capacité d'apporter des avantages aux peuples autochtones et de les impliquer ? Si oui, comment ?
- Quel est l'équilibre entre les sexes au sein du personnel du projet ? Quelles mesures ont été prises pour garantir l'équilibre entre les hommes et les femmes au sein du personnel du projet ?
- Quel est l'équilibre entre les hommes et les femmes au sein du conseil d'administration du projet ? Quelles mesures ont été prises pour garantir l'équilibre entre les hommes et les femmes au sein du conseil d'administration du projet ?

Planification du travail :

- Examinez les éventuels retards dans le démarrage et la mise en œuvre des projets, en identifiant les causes et en vérifiant si elles ont été résolues.

[7] Remplir à l'aide des données du cadre logique et des fiches de résultats
[8] Remplir à l'aide des données du Document de projet
[9] Le cas échéant
[10] Indiquer par code couleur uniquement cette colonne
[11] Utiliser l'échelle d'évaluation des progrès à 6 niveaux : HS, S, MS, MU, U, HU

- Examiner les processus de planification du travail mis en place par l'agent d'exécution/le partenaire d'exécution et/ou le PNUD. Identifier les lacunes et les domaines à améliorer et recommander des solutions.
- Les processus de planification du travail sont-ils axés sur les résultats ? Si ce n'est pas le cas, suggérez des moyens de réorienter la planification du travail pour qu'elle soit axée sur les résultats.
- Examinez l'utilisation du cadre de résultats/cadre logique du projet en tant qu'outil de gestion et examiner les modifications qui y ont été apportées depuis le début du projet.

Financement et co-financement :

- Examinez la gestion financière du projet, en vous référant spécifiquement au rapport coût-efficacité des interventions.
- Examinez les modifications apportées aux affectations de fonds à la suite des révisions budgétaires et évaluez l'opportunité et la pertinence de ces révisions.
- Le projet dispose-t-il des contrôles financiers appropriés, y compris en matière de rapports et de planification, qui permettent à la direction de prendre des décisions éclairées concernant le budget et d'assurer un flux de fonds en temps voulu ? Dans cet examen des contrôles financiers, inclure un examen des arrangements en matière d'établissement de rapports et de planification, entre l'agent d'exécution/partenaire d'exécution et la partie responsable (WCS) et le PNUD.
- Sur la base du tableau de suivi du cofinancement à remplir par l'unité de mise en service et l'équipe de projet, fournir des commentaires sur le cofinancement : le cofinancement est-il utilisé de manière stratégique pour contribuer à la réalisation des objectifs du projet ? L'équipe de projet rencontre-t-elle régulièrement tous les partenaires de cofinancement afin d'aligner les priorités de financement et les plans de travail annuels ?

Sources de co-financement	Nom du co-financeur	Type de co-financement	Montant du co-financement confirmé lors de l'approbation par le CEO (US$)	Montant des contributions au moment de l'évaluation à mi-parcours (US$)	Réel % du montant attendu
TOTAL					

Incluez le modèle de co-financement du FEM qui classe les montants de cofinancement par source en "investissements mobilisés" ou "dépenses récurrentes".

Systèmes de suivi et d'évaluation au niveau du projet :

- Examinez les outils de suivi actuellement utilisés : Fournissent-ils les informations nécessaires ? Impliquent-ils les partenaires clés ? Sont-ils alignés ou intégrés aux systèmes nationaux ? Utilisent-ils les informations existantes ? Sont-ils efficaces ? Sont-ils rentables ? Des outils supplémentaires sont-ils nécessaires ? Comment les rendre plus participatifs et plus inclusifs ?
- Examinez la gestion financière du budget de suivi et d'évaluation du projet. Des ressources suffisantes sont-elles allouées au suivi et à l'évaluation ? Ces ressources sont-elles allouées de manière efficace ?
- Examinez dans quelle mesure les questions de genre pertinentes ont été intégrées dans les systèmes de suivi. Voir l'annexe nine du document Guidance for Conducting Midterm Reviews of UNDP-Supported, GEF-Financed Projects.
- Examinez dans quelle mesure les risques du projet identifiés lors de la conception du projet ont été intégrés dans le suivi du projet. Un suivi de la mise en œuvre des mesures d'atténuation environnementales et sociales a-t-il été effectué ? Quels sont les résultats pertinents ? Identifiez les lacunes du système de suivi et d'evaluation existant pour les risques du projet et l'efficacité des mesures d'atténuation

Engagement des parties prenantes :

- Gestion du projet : Le projet a-t-il développé et exploité les partenariats nécessaires et appropriés avec les parties prenantes directes et indirectes ?
- Participation et processus pilotés par le pays : Les parties prenantes des gouvernements locaux et nationaux soutiennent-elles les objectifs du projet ? Continuent-elles à jouer un rôle actif dans la prise de décision relative au projet, ce qui favorise une mise en œuvre efficace et efficiente du projet ?
- Participation et sensibilisation du public : Dans quelle mesure la participation des parties prenantes et la sensibilisation du public ont-elles contribué à la réalisation des objectifs du projet ?
- Le projet possède-t-il un protocol CLIP ? Les peuples autochtones estiment que les consultations et communications des acteurs du projet respectent ce protocole ? L'accompagnement des peuples autochtones par le REPALEF dans la conception du projet s'est-il matérialisé ?
- Comment le projet fait-il participer les femmes et les jeunes filles ? Le projet est-il susceptible d'avoir les mêmes effets positifs et/ou négatifs sur les femmes et les hommes, les filles et les garçons ? Identifiez, si possible, les

contraintes juridiques, culturelles ou religieuses qui pèsent sur la participation des femmes au projet. Que peut faire le projet pour améliorer ses avantages en termes de genre ?

Le projet dispose-t-il d'un mécanisme de gestion des plaintes fonctionnel ?

Normes sociales et environnementales (sauvegardes) :

- Validez les risques identifiés dans le SESP plus récent du projet, et les évaluations de ces risques. Des révisions sont-elles nécessaires par rapport à la catégorisation globale des risques de sauvegarde du projet, les types de risques identifiés, et/ou les mesures de mitigation proposées ?
- Évaluer les risques (non-identifiés dans le SESP initial) en lien avec le recrutement, la formation et le déploiement proposé d'écogardes / patrouilles de lutte anti-braconnage par rapport à la NES 3 et NES 7 du PNUD. Des mesures spécifiques sont-elles requises avant d'entamer ce volet du projet ?
- Examiner les conclusions et évaluer les progrès réalisés dans la mise en œuvre des recommandations de toute évaluation d'impact environnemental et social du projet et/ou évaluation environnementale et sociale stratégique préparée lors de la conception ou de la mise en œuvre du projet (le cas échéant). N.B. l'EIES et le PGES complétés en 2024 pour une base de vie du projet ne sont pas conformes aux NES du PNUD, qui requiert que tous les risques substantiels/élevés soient l'objet d'EIES.
- Décrivez et évaluez les progrès réalisés dans la mise en œuvre des mesures de gestion sociale et environnementale du projet, telles que décrites dans les plans de sauvegardes environnementales et sociales soumises à l'approbation du projet, et les recommandations des NES du PNUD au cours de la mise en œuvre pour soutenir l'alignement sur les politiques de sauvegarde du PNUD. Ces mesures de gestion peuvent inclure des plans de gestion environnementale et sociale (PGES) ou d'autres plans de gestion, mais peuvent également inclure des aspects de la conception d'un projet.
- Faire une évaluation détaillée de la mise en œuvre du Mécanisme de plaintes et de règlement de griefs (GRM) du projet en termes d'accessibilité et de fonctionnalité, en ligne avec les critères des UN *Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights*.
- N.B. Un projet donné doit être évalué par rapport à la version de la politique de sauvegarde du PNUD en vigueur au moment de l'approbation du projet. Ici il s'agit des NES 2021.

Rapports :

- Évaluez comment les changements de gestion adaptative ont été rapportés par la direction du projet et partagés avec le Comité de Pilotage du projet.
- Évaluez dans quelle mesure l'équipe de projet et les partenaires respectent les exigences du FEM en matière d'établissement de rapports (c'est-à-dire comment ils ont traité les rapports d'évaluation du projet mal notés, le cas échéant).
- Évaluez comment les enseignements tirés du processus de gestion adaptative ont été documentés, partagés avec les partenaires clés et internalisés par les partenaires.

Communication et gestion des connaissances :

- Examinez la communication interne du projet avec les parties prenantes : La communication est-elle régulière et efficace ? Certaines parties prenantes clés sont-elles exclues de la communication ? Existe-t-il des mécanismes de retour d'information lorsque la communication est reçue ? Cette communication avec les parties prenantes contribue-t-elle à les sensibiliser aux résultats et aux activités du projet et à investir dans la durabilité des résultats du projet ?
- Examinez la communication externe du projet : Des moyens de communication appropriés ont-ils été mis en place ou sont-ils en train de l'être pour faire connaître au public l'état d'avancement du projet et l'impact escompté (y a-t-il une présence sur le web, par exemple ?) ? Le projet a-t-il mis en œuvre des campagnes d'information et de sensibilisation appropriées ?)
- Pour les besoins du rapport, rédigez un paragraphe d'une demi-page qui résume les progrès du projet vers les résultats en termes de contribution aux bénéfices du développement durable, ainsi qu'aux bénéfices pour l'environnement mondial.
- Dressez la liste des activités/produits de connaissance développés (sur la base de l'approche de gestion de la connaissance approuvée lors de l'approbation du CEO).

Durabilité

- Validez si les risques identifiés dans le document de projet, l'examen annuel du projet/les rapports d'exécution et le registre des risques QUANTUM sont les plus importants et si les côtes de risque appliquées sont appropriées et à jour. Si ce n'est pas le cas, expliquez pourquoi.
- En outre, évaluez les risques suivants pour la durabilité :

Risques financiers pour la viabilité :

Quelle est la probabilité que les ressources financières et économiques ne soient pas disponibles une fois que l'aide du FEM aura pris fin (les ressources potentielles peuvent provenir de sources multiples, telles que les secteurs public et privé, les activités génératrices de revenus et d'autres financements qui constitueront des ressources financières adéquates pour maintenir les résultats du projet) ?

Risques socio-économiques pour la durabilité :

Existe-t-il des risques sociaux ou politiques susceptibles de compromettre la durabilité des résultats du projet ? Quel est le risque que le niveau d'appropriation par les parties prenantes (y compris par les gouvernements et d'autres parties prenantes clés) soit insuffisant pour permettre la pérennisation des résultats/avantages du projet ? Les différentes parties prenantes clés considèrent-elles qu'il soit dans leur intérêt que les avantages du projet continuent à se manifester ? Le public et les parties prenantes sont-ils suffisamment sensibilisés aux objectifs à long terme du projet ? Les enseignements tirés sont-ils continuellement documentés par l'équipe de projet et partagés/transférés aux parties appropriées qui pourraient tirer des enseignements du projet et éventuellement le reproduire et/ou l'étendre à l'avenir ?

Risques liés au cadre institutionnel et à la gouvernance :

Les cadres juridiques, les politiques, les structures et les processus de gouvernance présentent-ils des risques susceptibles de compromettre la pérennité des avantages du projet ? Lors de l'évaluation de ce paramètre, il convient également de déterminer si les systèmes/mécanismes requis pour la responsabilité, la transparence et le transfert de connaissances techniques sont en place.

Risques environnementaux pour la durabilité :

Existe-t-il des risques environnementaux susceptibles de compromettre la pérennité des résultats du projet ?

Conclusions et recommandations

Le consultant/l'équipe de la mission inclura dans le rapport de l'évaluation à mi-parcours une section consacrée aux conclusions fondées sur des preuves, à la lumière des résultats. Il/elle devra formuler des recommandations à l'intention de l'équipe de projet. Les recommandations devront être des suggestions succinctes d'intervention critique qui sont spécifiques, mesurables, réalisables et pertinentes. Un tableau des recommandations devra figurer dans le résumé du rapport. Veuillez vous référer à la directive sur le contenu du tableau de recommandations.

Le consultant/l'équipe de la mission ne devra pas formuler plus de 15 recommandations au total.

Évaluations

L'équipe de la mission inclura ses évaluations des résultats du projet et de brèves descriptions des réalisations associées dans un tableau de synthèse des évaluations et des réalisations de la mission dans le résumé du rapport de la mission (cfr annexes des termes de référence).

Tableau de résumé de l'évaluation et des réalisations de l'examen à mi-parcours du (*Titre du Projet*)

Evaluation	Notations de l'évaluation à mi-parcours	Description des realizations
Stratégie du Projet	N/A	
Progrès accomplis vers l'atteinte des résultats	Evaluation de la réalisation de l'objectif : (sur une échelle à 6 niveaux)	
	Produit 1 Evaluation de la réalisation (sur une échelle à 6 niveaux)	
	Produit 2 Évaluation de la réalisation (sur une échelle à 6 niveaux)	
	Produit 3 Évaluation de la réalisation (sur une échelle à 6 niveaux)	
	Etc.	

Mise en œuvre du Projet et Gestion Adaptive	(Sur une échelle à 6 niveaux)	
Durabilité	(Sur une échelle à 4 niveaux)	

G. Résultats attendus et principaux livrables

Le consultante internationale (MTR Team Lead) /l'équipe de la mission devra préparer et soumettre :

- Le rapport de démarrage de la mission d'évaluation : Il/elle clarifiera les objectifs et les méthodes de la réalisation de l'évaluation à mi-parcours au plus tard 2 semaines avant la mission proprement dite. A envoyer à l'unité de mise en service et à la direction du projet. Date d'achèvement : (date)
- Présentation : Il/elle présentera les premières conclusions à la direction du projet et à l'unité chargée de la mise en service à la fin de la mission d'examen à mi-parcours. Date d'achèvement : (date)
- Projet de rapport de l'évaluation : L'équipe de la mission soumettra le projet de rapport complet avec les annexes dans les 3 semaines suivant la mission d'évaluation. Date d'achèvement : (date)
- Rapport final : L'équipe chargée de l'évaluation soumettra le rapport révisé avec ses annexes et une piste d'audit complète détaillant la manière dont tous les commentaires reçus ont (ou n'ont pas) été pris en compte dans le rapport final de l'évaluation. À envoyer à l'unité de mise en service dans un délai d'une semaine à compter de la réception des commentaires du PNUD sur le projet. Date d'achèvement : (date)
- Le rapport final de l'évaluation à mi-parcours doit être rédigé en anglais. Le cas échéant, l'unité mandatrice pourra choisir d'organiser une traduction du rapport dans une langue plus largement partagée par les parties prenantes nationales.

Arrangement institutionnel

C'est l'Unité mandatrice qui a la responsabilité principale de gérer l'examen à mi-parcours. L'Unité mandatrice de l'examen à mi-parcours du projet est le bureau pays du PNUD. L'Unité mandatrice passera un contrat avec les consultants et s'assurera que l'équipe chargée de l'examen à mi-parcours disposera en temps utile des indemnités journalières et des facilités de voyage dans le pays. L'équipe de projets aura la responsabilité de prendre contact avec l'équipe chargée de l'examen à mi-parcours afin de lui fournir tous les documents nécessaires, de préparer les entretiens avec les parties prenantes, et d'organiser les visites sur le terrain.

Durée des travaux

La durée totale de la réalisation de l'évaluation à mi-parcours sera d'environ 35 jours ouvrés à compter du 10 novembre 2025 jusqu'au 30 mars 2025. Le calendrier provisoire de l'examen à mi-parcours est le suivant :

CALENDRIER	ACTIVITÉ
15 octobre 2025	Clôture des candidatures.
1O novembre 2025	Sélection de l'équipe chargé de l'examen à mi-parcours.
Date	Préparation de l'équipe (remise des Documents de projet).
Dates xx jours (nb de jours recommandés : 2-4)	Examen des documents, entretiens préliminaires (en virtuelle) avec l'équipe du projet et les partenaires et préparation du Rapport initial d'examen à mi-parcours.
Dates xx jours	Finalisation et validation du Rapport d'initiation de l'examen à mi-parcours- au plus tard au début de la mission pour l'examen à mi-parcours.
Dates XX jours (nb de jours recommandés : ~14)	Mission pour l'examen à mi-parcours : réunions avec les parties prenantes, entretiens, visites sur le terrain.
Date	Réunion de synthèse de la mission et présentation des premières conclusions - au plus tôt à la fin de la mission pour l'examen à mi-parcours.
Dates XX jours (nb de jours recommandés : 5-10)	Préparation du projet de rapport.
Dates XX jours (nb de jours recommandés : 1-2)	Incorporer un système de renvoi aux documents du retour d'information dans le projet de rapport/finalisation du rapport d'examen à mi-parcours
Dates	Préparation et publication d'une réponse de la direction.
Date	Facultatif) organisation d'un atelier avec les parties prenantes (pas obligatoire pour l'équipe chargée de l'examen à mi-parcours)
Date	Date prévue d'achèvement de l'ensemble du processus d'examen à mi-parcours.

Les possibilités de visites de terrains devraient être exposées dans le rapport de démarrage de la mission d'évaluation.

Lieu d'affectation

Le consultant international pourra travailler à distance mais devra planifier séjourner en RDC pour pouvoir échanger avec les différentes parties prenantes engagées dans la mise en œuvre de ce projet. Avec l'appui du consultant national, ils pourront effectuer certaines missions dans la Province du Tanganyika et celle du Sud-Kivu où se déroulent la mise en œuvre de certaines activités du projet. Une mission en RDC est requise pour une durée d'environ 2 semaines.

Déplacements :

- Le cours de formation BSAFE devra être suivi avec succès avant le début du voyage ; Voici le lien pour accéder à cette formation : https://training.dss.un.org/courses/login/index.php
- Les consultants seront tenus de se conformer aux directives de sécurité des Nations unies énoncées à l'adresse https://dss.un.org/dssweb/.
- Tous les frais de déplacement à l'intérieur du pays vers les sites du projet seront couverts et remboursés conformément aux règles et règlements du PNUD sur présentation d'un formulaire de demande de remboursement F-10 et des pièces justificatives.

COMPETENCES ET EXPERIENCES REQUISES

Qualifications des candidats retenus

Une équipe de deux consultants indépendants dont un international ayant l'expérience et la connaissance de projets et d'évaluations dans d'autres régions du monde et un national sera recrutée dans le cadre de contrats distincts. Les consultants à recruter ne doivent pas avoir participé à la préparation, à la formulation et/ou à la mise en œuvre du projet (y compris la rédaction du document de projet) et ne doivent pas avoir de conflit d'intérêts avec les activités liées au projet ou les partenaires de mise en œuvre du projet.

La sélection de consultante internationale (chef d'équipe MTR) visera à maximiser les qualités globales de l'équipe dans les domaines suivants :

Formation

Maîtrise en évaluation des projets, gestion de l'environnement et un autre domaine jugé pertinent (10%).

Expériences

- Expérience récente et compétence démontrée des méthodologies d'évaluation de la gestion axée sur les résultats avec l'évaluation des projets du FEM ; (20%)
- Expérience de l'application des objectifs SMART et de la reconstitution ou de la validation des scénarios de référence ; (10%)
- Compétence avérée des questions liées au genre et aux droits des peuples autochtones dans le cadre de projets de conservation de la biodiversité ; (20%)
- Compétence en matière d'évaluation de programmes d'alternatives économiques / moyens de subsistance culturellement appropriés, dans le cadre de projets de conservation de la biodiversité et de régime foncier ; (10%)
- Compétence démontrée et compréhension des processus de gestion de projet du FEM (5 %)
- Expérience professionnelle d'au moins 10 ans dans des domaines techniques pertinents ; (10%)
- Expérience de travail dans les régions du projet sur les questions liées à la conservation et/ou les droits de l'homme ; (5%)
- Une expérience de l'évaluation/examen de projets au sein du système des Nations unies ; (5%)

Langue

- Maîtrise de l'Anglais écrit et parlé (5%).
- Maîtrise du Français écrit et parlé requise
- Excellente communication orale et écrite.

Éthique

L'équipe chargée de l'évaluation sera tenue de respecter les normes éthiques les plus strictes et devra signer un code de conduite lors de l'acceptation de la mission. Cette mission sera menée conformément aux principes énoncés dans les "Directives éthiques pour l'évaluation" de l'UNEG (‘*Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation*’). L'équipe chargée de l'évaluation devra préserver les droits et la confidentialité des fournisseurs d'informations, des

personnes interrogées et des parties prenantes en prenant des mesures visant à garantir le respect des codes juridiques et autres codes pertinents régissant la collecte et la communication des données. Elle devra également assurer la sécurité des informations collectées avant et après l'évaluation et des protocoles visant à garantir l'anonymat et la confidentialité des sources d'information lorsque cela est prévu. Les informations, les connaissances et les données recueillies dans le cadre du processus de l'évaluation devront également être utilisées exclusivement pour l'évaluation du projet et non pour d'autres usages sans l'autorisation expresse du PNUD et de ses partenaires.

Calendrier des paiements

- 20 % à la livraison satisfaisante du rapport final de démarrage de la mission et à son approbation par l'unité de mise en service du projet.
- 40 % à la remise satisfaisante du projet de rapport initial d'évaluation à l'unité de mise en service du projet
- 40% du paiement à la livraison satisfaisante du rapport final de l'évaluation à mi-parcours du projet et à l'approbation de l'Unité de mise en service et de conseillers régionaux. Critères pour l'émission du paiement final de 40 % : (i) Le rapport final d'évaluation comprend toutes les exigences énoncées dans les termes de référence et est conforme aux orientations de l'évaluation MTR du PNUD ; (ii) Le rapport final de l'évaluation est clairement rédigé, organisé de manière logique et spécifique à ce projet (c'est-à-dire que le texte n'a pas été copié-collé à partir d'autres rapports rédigés dans de circonstances similaires).

PROCESSUS DE CANDIDATURE

Présentation recommandée de l'offre

a) **Lettre de confirmation d'intérêt et de disponibilité** en utilisant le modèle[12] fourni par le PNUD ;
b) Un CV et un **formulaire d'antécédents personnels** (formulaire P11[13]) ;
c) **Brève description de l'approche du travail/proposition technique** expliquant pourquoi le candidat se considère comme le plus apte à remplir la mission, et proposition de méthodologie sur la manière dont il abordera et mènera à bien la mission ; (max 1 page)
d) **Une proposition financière** indiquant le prix total forfaitaire du contrat et tous les autres frais liés au voyage (tels que les billets d'avion, les indemnités journalières, etc.), accompagnée d'une ventilation des coûts, conformément au modèle joint à la lettre de confirmation d'intérêt. Si un candidat est employé par une organisation/société/institution et qu'il s'attend à ce que son employeur lui facture des frais de gestion dans le cadre du processus de mise à disposition du PNUD au titre de l'accord de prêt remboursable (APR), le candidat doit l'indiquer à ce stade et s'assurer que tous ces coûts sont dûment incorporés dans la proposition financière soumise au PNUD.
e) Tous les documents de candidature doivent être soumis à l'adresse (indiquer l'adresse) dans une enveloppe scellée indiquant la référence suivante : "Consultant pour l'évaluation à mi-parcours du Projet de gestion du paysage de la zone protégée de Kabobo Luama) ou par courrier électronique à l'adresse suivante UNIQUEMENT : soumission.info@undp.org d'ici le « date ». Les candidatures incomplètes ne seront pas prises en considération.

Critères de sélection de la meilleure offre

Seules les candidatures recevables et conformes seront évaluées. Les offres seront évaluées selon la méthode de la note combinée - où la formation et l'expérience dans des missions similaires seront pondérées à 70 % et la proposition de prix à 30 % de la note totale. Le candidat qui obtiendra la note combinée la plus élevée et qui aura également accepté les conditions générales du PNUD se verra attribuer le contrat.

12 https://intranet.undp.org/unit/bom/pso/Support%20documents%20on%20IC%20Guidelines/Template%20for%20Confirmation%20of%20Interest%20and%20Submission%20of%20Financial%20Proposal.docx

13 http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/Careers/P11_Personal_history_form.doc

6.2. Code of Conduct for Mid-Term Review Evaluators

Evaluators/consultants:

1. Must present complete and fair information in their assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well-founded.
2. Must disclose all evaluation findings, as well as information on their limitations, and make them available to all those concerned by the evaluation and who are legally entitled to receive the results.
3. Must protect the anonymity and confidentiality to which individuals who provide them with information are entitled. Assessors must allow sufficient time, minimise wasted time and respect individuals' right to privacy. Assessors must respect individuals' right to provide information in complete confidentiality and ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced back to its source. Evaluators should not evaluate individuals and should maintain a balance between evaluating management functions and this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported confidentially to the appropriate authorities responsible for investigating the matter. They must consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about whether to report issues and how to do so.
5. Must be sensitive to beliefs, customs and traditions and demonstrate integrity and honesty in their dealings with all stakeholders. In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender disparity. Evaluators should avoid anything that could offend the dignity or self-respect of the people they come into contact with during an evaluation. Recognising that an evaluation may have negative repercussions on the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a manner that fully respects the dignity and self-respect of stakeholders.
6. Are accountable for their performance and its outcomes. Evaluators must be able to present the evaluation, its limitations, findings, and recommendations clearly, accurately, and honestly, both in writing and orally.
7. Must comply with recognized accounting procedures and exercise prudence in the use of evaluation resources.

Mid-term evaluation consultant agreement form

Agreement to comply with the United Nations System Code of Conduct for Evaluation:

Name of consultant: **Dr Kai Schmidt-Soltau**

I confirm that I have received and understood the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluators and undertake to comply with it.

Signed at Cham on December 1, 2025,

Signature: _____

6.3. MTR evaluative matrix (evaluation criteria with key questions, indicators, sources of data, and methodology)

Evaluation questions	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
Project strategy: To what extent does the project strategy correspond to the country's priorities, the country's ownership of the project and the best way to achieve the expected results?			
(include evaluative question(s))	i.e. relationships established, level of consistency between project design and implementation approach, specific activities carried out, quality of risk mitigation strategies, etc.)	(project documents, national policies or strategies, websites, project staff, project partners, data collected throughout the RMP mission, etc.)	(document analysis, data analysis, interviews with project staff, interviews with stakeholders, etc.)
Progress towards results: To what extent have the expected results and objectives of the project been achieved so far?			
Project implementation and adaptive management: Has the project been implemented effectively and cost-efficiently and been able to adapt to changing conditions so far? To what extent do project monitoring and evaluation systems, reporting, and communications support project implementation? To what extent has progress been made in implementing social and environmental management measures? Have there been any changes to the overall risk assessment of the project and/or the types of risks identified during the approval phase by the Director-General?			
Sustainability: To what extent do financial, institutional, socio-economic and/or environmental risks affect the long-term sustainability of project results?			

Rating of progress towards results: (one rating for each outcome and for the objective)		
6	Very satisfactory	The objective/outcome should meet or exceed all its targets by the end of the project, with no major shortfalls. Progress towards the objective/outcome can be presented as 'good practice'.
5	Satisfactory	The objective/outcome should achieve most of the end-of-project targets, with only a few minor shortcomings.
4	Moderately satisfactory	The objective/outcome should achieve most of the end-of-project targets, but with significant shortcomings.
3	Moderately unsatisfactory	The objective/outcome is expected to achieve its end-of-project targets with major shortcomings.
2	Unsatisfactory	The objective/outcome is not expected to achieve most of its end-of-project targets.
1	Very unsatisfactory	The objective/outcome has not achieved its mid-term targets and is not expected to achieve any of its end-of-project targets.

Scores for project implementation and adaptive management: (one overall score)		
6	Very satisfactory	The implementation of the seven components – management arrangements, work planning, financing and co-financing, project-level monitoring and evaluation systems, stakeholder engagement, reporting and communications – leads to effective and efficient project implementation and adaptive management. The project can be presented as a 'good practice'.
5	Satisfactory	The implementation of most of the seven components leads to efficient and effective project implementation and adaptive management, with the exception of only a few that are subject to corrective action.
4	Moderately satisfactory	The implementation of some of the seven components leads to efficient and effective project implementation and adaptive management, while some components require corrective action.
3	Moderately unsatisfactory	The implementation of some of the seven components does not allow for effective and efficient project implementation and adaptation, with most components requiring corrective measures.
2	Unsatisfactory	The implementation of most of the seven components does not result in efficient and effective project implementation and adaptive management.
1	Very unsatisfactory	The implementation of none of the seven components leads to efficient and effective project implementation and adaptive management.

Sustainability rating: (overall score)		
4	Likely	Negligible risks to sustainability, with key results being achieved at project closure and expected to continue into the foreseeable future.
3	Moderately likely	Moderate risks, but at least some results are expected to be sustainable due to progress made in achieving results at the mid-term review.
2	Moderately unlikely	Significant risk that key results will not continue after project closure, although some outputs and activities are expected to continue.
1	Unlikely	Significant risk that project results and key achievements will not be sustained.

6.5. MTR mission itinerary

6.6. List of people interviewed.

N°	Noms et prénoms	Fonction	Contact
1	OSSIE OLAS Eric	Conservateur Chet de Site Adjoint RF Kabobo-Luana, ICCN/Kalemie	0816686165
2	TUMONAKIESE MAKWALA Bertin	Conservateur Chet de Site RF Kabobo-Luana, ICCN/Tanganyika	0813122588
3	David AMANI	Conservateur Chet de Site RF Ngandja, ICCN/Sud Kivu	08147395377
4	André MATALA	Chef de Division et Coordonnateur Provincial de l'Environnement	0814645167
5	Salomon KALUNGA	Chef de Bureau Administration et Finance, Division provinciale de l'Environnement	0812638336
6	Véronique BUYAMBA	Chef de Bureau Conservation de la Nature, Division provinciale de l'Environnement	0824545824
7	Modeste KABAZI	Coordonnateur Adjoint CLG	0900004809
8	Noëlla OMBALAKA	Représentante des Femmes Bantoues CLG	0828118245
9	MAHAYO BULELI	Chef de Groupement Lambo Katenga	0824032660
10	BAMBA Alexandre	Représentant Groupement Miketo	0973382009
11	MASUDI Patrice	Représentant Groupement Mahila	0817185896
12	USENI KASANGA	Coordonnateur CLG	0812867436
13	AL HADJI ABDALLAH ABEDI	Membre de CLG et Chef de Groupement Kasenga Mtoa	0819414055
14	Etienne KALONDA	Membre de CLG et Chef de Groupement Mulolwa	0821090586
15	Emmanuel KILUBA WA KILUBA	Secrétaire Adjoint ADEPYT (Association pour le Développement des Pygmées de Tanganyika)	0824926740
16	KILUBAMANGOBO	Coordonnateur ADEPYT	0817675680
17	SUNGWE NONDO Denis	Moniteur Communautaire RF Kabobo-Luama	0825263062
18	ITUNGULU NGABO Serges	Site Finance Manager	0991790470
19	Vivien ASANI	Charge de la Conservation Communautaire WCS Kalemie	0815424409

To be completed

6.7. List of documents reviewed.

1) PIF
2) UNDP initiation plan
3) UNDP Project Document
4) UNDP Social and Environmental Screening Procedure (SESP)
5) Project start-up report
6) All project implementation reports (PIR)
7) Quarterly progress reports and work plans from the various implementation teams.
8) Audit reports
9) Documents relating to social and environmental safeguards (assessments and management plans) developed during project implementation
10) Monitoring tools/baseline indicators finalised for the GEF area of intervention upon approval by the Managing Director and at mid-term
11) Supervision mission reports
12) All monitoring reports prepared by the project
13) Financial and administrative guidelines used by the project team
14) Project operational guidelines, manuals, and systems
15) UNDP programme document(s) for the country(ies) concerned
16) Minutes of meetings of the board of directors of (project title) and other meetings (e.g., project evaluation committee meetings)
17) Location maps of the project site
18) Any additional documents, if applicable

To be completed

6.8. Signed MTR final report clearance form.

Mid-term review report revised and approved by :

Mandating Unit (M&E Focal Point)

Name : _____

Signature : _____ Date : _____

Regional Technical Advisor (Nature, Climate and Energy)

Name : _____

Signature : _____ Date : _____

Annexed in a separate file: Audit trail from received comments on draft MTR report.

Author	#	Para No./location of comment	Comments on the draft mid-term evaluation report	Evaluation team, response and actions taken